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# From the Senate to the White House: Comparing John F. Kennedy's Evolving Position on Colonialism in Algeria and Palestine

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**Aboud & Djabali I**

## Dedication

To my mom and my beloved ones, especially Alaa, Ashwak, and Mohamed. Thank you for encouraging me and for being part of this achievement.

**Aboud Bouthaina**

First, I want to thank Allah for his Guidance and blessing. I'm sure that this work would have never completed without his Guidance. It is with my deepest gratitude and warmest affection that I dedicate this dissertation to the following: my queen and king Abdelhamid and Warda who are the source of love, support and motivation, to my brothers and sister and all my friends

**Ikram Djabali**

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## Abstract

This dissertation examines the evolution of John F. Kennedy‘s foreign policy stance on Algeria and Palestine, both during his time as a U.S. Senator and later as President. As a Senator, Kennedy was a vocal advocate for self-determination and often supported emerging nations in the Third World. He notably criticized French colonial rule in Algeria, demonstrating early support for Algerian independe5nce. However, once he took the presidency, his administration adopted a more cautious approach due to the strategic alliance with France. In contrast, Kennedy's position on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was more complex. His decision to authorize the sale of Hawk missiles to Israel marked the beginning of the U.S.-Israeli special relationship. This study argues that Kennedy‘s policies towards Algeria and Palestine were influenced primarily by Cold War competition and domestic political considerations, reflecting Realpolitik and idealism. The aim of this research is to provide an overview of Kennedy‘s background and his policies toward North Africa and the Middle East, focusing on key events during his presidency. The study adopts a historical methodology to analyze significant developments such as the Palestinian Fedayeen and the Algerian FLN a key resistance movement. The findings suggest that Kennedy’s foreign policy approach tended to prioritize geopolitical strategy over consistent ideological support for decolonization movements.


**Key words:** John F. Kennedy, Foreign policy, Algeria, Palestine, Cold War, Realpolitik, Colonialism.

**ملخص**

تتناول هذه الرسالة تطور موقف جون ف. كينيدي من السياسة الخارجية تجاه الجزائر وفلسطين، سواء خلال فترة عمله كعضو في مجلس الشيوخ الأمريكي أو لاحقًا كرئيس للولايات المتحدة. كان كينيدي، بصفته عضوًا في مجلس الشيوخ، مناصِرًا صريحًا لحق الشعوب في تقرير المصير، وغالبًا ما دعم الدول الناشئة في العالم الثالث. وقد انتقد الاستعمار الفرنسي في الجزائر بشكل لافت، مما عكس دعمه المبكر لاستقلال الجزائر. ومع ذلك، عند توليه الرئاسة، تبنت إدارته نهجًا أكثر حذرًا بسبب التحالف الاستراتيجي مع فرنسا. وعلى النقيض من ذلك، كان موقف كينيدي من الصراع الفلسطيني-الإسرائيلي أكثر تعقيدًا؛ إذ شكّل قراره بالموافقة على بيع صواريخ "هوك" لإسرائيل بدايةً للعلاقة الخاصة بين الولايات المتحدة وإسرائيل.تجادل هذه الدراسة بأن سياسات كينيدي تجاه الجزائر وفلسطين كانت تتأثر أساسًا بالتنافس في إطار الحرب الباردة، إضافةً إلى الاعتبارات السياسية الداخلية، وهو ما يعكس مزيجًا من الواقعية السياسية والمثالية. وتهدف هذه الدراسة إلى تقديم نظرة عامة على خلفية كينيدي وسياساته تجاه شمال إفريقيا والشرق الأوسط، مع التركيز على الأحداث الرئيسية خلال الاستراتيجية الجيوسياسية، أكثر من كونها تعبيرًا عن دعم أيديولوجي لحركات التحرر الوطني.

**الكلمات المفتاحية:** جون كينيدي , الحرب الباردة المثالية , الجزائر فلسطين الواقعية، الاستعمار.

## Résumé

Cette étude soutient que les politiques de Kennedy à l'égard de l'Algérie et de la Palestine ont été principalement influencées par la compétition de la guerre froide et par des considérations politiques internes, reflétant un équilibre entre Realpolitik et idéalisme. L'objectif de cette recherche est de fournir un aperçu du parcours de Kennedy et de ses politiques envers l'Afrique du Nord et le Moyen-Orient, en se concentrant sur les événements clés de sa présidence. L'étude adopte une méthodologie historique pour analyser des développements significatifs tels que la question des réfugiés palestiniens et le mouvement algérien du FLN (Front de Libération Nationale). Les résultats suggèrent que la politique étrangère de Kennedy était davantage dictée par une stratégie géopolitique que par un soutien idéologique à la libération nationale.

**Mots-clés :** John F. Kennedy, guerre froide, Algérie, Palestine, réalisme politique, colonialisme

## List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

**CENTO**: Central Treaty Organization

**CIA:** Central Intelligence Agency

**FLN:** National Liberation Front (Front de Liberation Nationale)

**JFK:** John F. Kennedy

**NAM:** Non- Aligned Movement

**NATO:** North Atlantic Treaty Organization

**OAPEC:** Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries

**PGAR:** Provisional Government of the Algeria Republic

**UN:** United Nations

**USA:** United States of America

**USSR:** Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

**WWII:** World War Two

**UNSCOP:** United Nations Special Committee on Palestine

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## General Introduction

The twentieth century was characterized by two major forces: colonialism and Cold War competition. As nations struggled for self-determination, many viewed independence and sovereignty as the only viable solutions. During this period, two key regions like Algeria and Palestine were deeply affected by both colonial rule and the strategic ambitions of global superpowers. The Middle East and North Africa, in particular, have long been areas of interest due to their valuable resources and geopolitical significance, a condition that continues to this day.

Frantz Fanon stated that "colonialism is not a machine capable of thinking, a body endowed with reason. It is violence in its natural state (Fanon23). This means that colonialism is like a motionless machine that follows orders blindly. As a result of colonialism, anti-colonial movements emerged across Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, advocating for national rights and challenging the authority of Western powers. These movements attracted global attention and sympathy, and during this time, the United States began to show support for some of these nations in their struggle against colonialism. Algeria and Palestine serve as powerful examples of how Western powers, including the United States, have exploited colonized nations. While the U.S. publicly declared its support for self-determination and liberty, its foreign policy often reflected contradictory actions, influenced more by geopolitical interests than genuine support for decolonization. John F. Kennedy, the American historical figure both as a senator and as a president oversaw crucial moments and events. He was known for his efforts to promote global peace and his vision of an ideal world free from conflict and oppression. Kennedy consistently spoke out against imperialism and expressed deep sympathy for colonized peoples

This study examines and compares Kennedy's early speeches from the 1950s through to the end of his presidency in 1963. It highlights how his actions did not always align with his words particularly in his attempts to balance U.S. interests between supporting French colonial control in Algeria and addressing the complex

conflict between Israel and Palestine. His foreign policy was shaped by the combination of moral principles and strategic interests.

Various reasons motivated us to undertake this research, and the choice of Algeria and Palestine is not coincidental. These cases test Kennedy‘s position on European imperialism, since he strongly opposed all forms of colonialism. He also had to manage complex alliances such as those of NATO’s membership like France and the U.S. loyalty to Israel. Kennedy wanted to address and confronted both issues at the same time the Israeli conflict, which has lasted for decades and continues today, and Algeria‘s long struggle for independence after 132 years of colonization.

Moreover, Algeria and Palestine present distinct cases of national liberation struggles that demanded international attention during Kennedy‘s presidency. Both cases depicted justice, diplomacy, and power, while reflecting also U.S. neutrality and strategic priorities.

This research, therefore, contributes to a deeper understanding of Kennedy’s administration and its approach to Arab countries during the Cold War. Scholars such as Matthew Connelly and Warren Bass have examined specific elements of Kennedy’s position on the Middle East and North Africa, particularly his stance on colonialism. This study fills the gap between Realpolitik and Idealism in John F. Kennedy’s foreign policy by analyzing U.S. policy toward Algeria and Palestine that was guided by either moral values (Idealism) or strategic interests (Realpolitik).

This dissertation therefore examines the shift of John F. Kennedy’s positions on colonialism in Algeria and Palestine between his presidency and his senatorship and questions the reasons behind it. In doing so, the dissertation investigates whether John F. Kennedy was genuinely concerned about humanitarian issues or whether he was driven by other political drives and pressure?

In order to conduct this research, a historical analytical method has been used, relying on primary sources such as Kennedy's speeches and archives from the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, as well as on secondary sources including books and scholarly articles.

This dissertation is divided into three chapters. Chapter One provides an overview of U.S. foreign policy towards the Middle East and North Africa and tracing back the historical origins and evolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Algerian War of Independence. Chapter Two examines Kennedy's stance on both cases, during and before his presidency, highlighting major events. Chapter Three, tries to offer an interpretation of Kennedy's different positions, exploring the tension between loyalty and ambiguity. In other words, the chapter presents a comparative analysis of Kennedy's evolving positions concerning Algeria and Palestine.

## Chapter One

## A Historical Overview and Preliminary Observations

The Cold War period (1947 – 1991) was an ideological war where the world was divided into two sections: the east Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the west the United States had adjusted its foreign policy in order to protect its peace and the world's peace by making alliances, pacts, and compromises to achieve its goal. While America had supported liberal democracy and capitalism, its first enemy became the Soviet Union and its ideology of Marxism, socialism, and communism, which kept them on different paths for decades.

U.S. foreign policy was carefully shaped by its presidents, and although their approaches and strategies differed, each made a significant impact on both American history and global affairs. Presidents such as Harry S. Truman, John F. Kennedy, Richard Nixon, Ronald Reagan, and George H. W. Bush were among the most influential leaders during this period. They all viewed Communism as a serious threat and a barrier to advancing their foreign policy goals.

As a result, the primary objective of U.S. foreign policy became the containment of Communism and the projection of American power on the global stage. To achieve this, the United States supported its allies politically, economically, and militarily—boosting their confidence and offering aid regardless of geographic location. These allies included countries across Asia, Africa, and Europe.

American foreign policy played a crucial role in achieving its strategic goals, ultimately enabling the United States to emerge as a global superpower in 1991 with the collapse of the Soviet Union into separate republics, including Russia an event that marked the end of the Cold War. To contain Communism, the United States implemented a range of strategies in the Mediterranean region. These included the Truman Doctrine (1947), the Marshall Plan (1948), Italy's NATO membership (1949), the deployment of the Sixth Fleet (1948),

and diplomatic efforts during the Cyprus crisis. However, the complexity and overlap of American strategic interests often led to seemingly paradoxical positions regarding colonization and decolonization. For example, the U.S. supported Libya's independence from Italy (1951), Lebanon's independence from France (1943), and partially supported Egypt's independence from Britain. Conversely, it backed Israel over Palestine during the Nakba of 1948, reinstated the Shah of Iran to protect oil interests, and remained largely passive during the Cyprus conflict to avoid tensions between NATO allies.

In the eastern flank of the Mediterranean the Middle East the U.S. pursued distinct policies to protect its geopolitical and economic interests. These efforts included the Truman Doctrine (1947), the Point Four Program (1949), the Suez Crisis intervention (1956), the Eisenhower Doctrine (1957), support for Israel (1967), the Camp David Accords (1978), the Reagan Doctrine, and the Gulf War (1990) The U.S. Department of State's Office of the Historian highlights the role played by the United States in allowing previously colonized countries to become independent states:

"The newly independent nations that emerged in the 1950s and the 1960s became an important factor in changing the balance of power within the United Nations. In 1946, there were 35 member states in the United Nations; as the newly independent nations of the "third world" joined the organization, by 1970 membership had swelled To 127. ("Decolonization of Asia and Africa") ".

The independence and decolonization movements, in their turn, have helped in creating global peace after they contributed in permitting many countries to join the United Nations. Both the U.S. and the U.N. relied on each other to try to solve the world's crises and regional conflicts, like in the Mediterranean's Algerian-French war and in the Middle East's Palestinian-Israeli case, which are considered to be a major contradictory case in the U.S. foreign policy because while the United States had supported Algeria instead of its ally NATO member France, it showed indifference in the case of Palestine craved self- determination but

was not supported; instead, the United States supported Israel, the colonizer, creating a huge contradiction and paradox.

**1.1The US Foreign Policy in the Mediterranean**

As mentioned earlier, while the USA emphasized the importance of liberalism and capitalism, the USSR saw that communism was the key to create a classless state-controlled society based on the Marxist-Leninist. This divergence in views between these two superpowers and their respective allies created worldwide tensions. The United States has extended its influence over Mediterranean countries due to their strategic geographical location and other reasons such as securing strategic naval access in the Mediterranean, supporting allies, ensuring economic stability, and managing regional crises.

> "The Mediterranean, because of its geography, is the political military, and economic junction of Europe, Asia minor and Africa, its eastern and southern shores have been a testing ground for the political ideologies, the economic systems, and the weapons of the Soviet Union and the United States" (Zoppo69).

In North Africa, the United States entertained relations with Algeria, Morocco, Libya, and Egypt, and in Southern Europe, it strengthened its relations with Turkey, Greece, Portugal, and Spain. The first US policy was the Truman Doctrine that designed to contain communism by providing economic and military help to both countries, Turkey and Greece in (1949) in and creating collective security plan to face the Soviet Union. The Marshall Plan (1948) aimed at rebuilding Europe included twelve different countries all over Europe: Belgium, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and the United Kingdom, besides the two North American countries the United States and Canada.

### 1.1.1The Mediterranean's Strategic Importance to the U.S.

The US containment strategy helped prevent the spread of communism in many regions like North Africa, the Middle East, and Southern Europe. The control gave the US and its allies many benefits due to the richness of the controlled countries with energy. For instance, The US imported oil from the Middle East, Libya, Algeria, and Egypt, and gas from Algeria, besides many other raw materials and primary sources like hydropower from the Mediterranean rivers that Spain and Italy used.

Moreover, the trading routes all over the Suez Canal helped shape the economy all over the world, guaranteeing the resistance of the US as a global superpower. The "world energy crisis that has been shaping the world economy, altering political outlooks and raising questions about international security" just emphasized the strategic importance of the Mediterranean basin (Zoppo 88). The changes post-World War II had to be studied and controlled in order to prevent human crises like poverty, hunger, turmoil, revolutions, and other possible wars. For instance, France, Britain, and Italy were losing their battles to their colonies due to the decolonization movements that were supported by the US and USSR who were aiming at gaining more allies to their side. Thus, in this context, France faced resistance not only in Algeria but also in Vietnam and in other African colonies like Tunisia, Morocco, and Madagascar. Italy, in its turn, lost Libya, Eritrea, and Somalia, while Britain, who had the largest colonial empire, also faced the same movement from its former colonies in India, Pakistan, Ghana, Nigeria, Kenya, Egypt, Iraq, the Persian Gulf, and Hong Kong.

### 1.1.2The U.S. Political and Diplomatic Relations in the Mediterranean

U.S. and NATO relations in the Mediterranean were largely aligned in their goal to prevent Soviet expansion. However, they also reflected internal ideological and strategic differences, shaped by the varying national interests of member states concerning regional security. NATO countries such as Italy, Greece, and Turkey played crucial roles in shaping the Mediterranean's Cold War dynamics through their active participation in

containment strategies and their involvement in various regional conflicts particularly in the southern Mediterranean.

Highlighting the strategic complexity of the region and the importance of U.S. naval presence, Admiral Horacio Rivero observed: "In addition to being isolated, the southern region is geographically fragmented. Italy, Greece, and Turkey each occupies a peninsula jutting in the Mediterranean, so that mutual support of those countries' land forces, except in the narrow area of Thrace, depends on movement by sea" (Rivero 69). This geographical fragmentation emphasized the necessity of maintaining a strong naval force, such as the U.S. Sixth Fleet, to ensure mobility, security, and coordination among allies in the region.in Italy, there were political conflicts and a Red Scare, which is any spate of communism/socialist infiltration. Greece had inner conflicts and also political upheaval. In Turkey, there was rivalry with Greece about a region called Cyprus.

> "The current state of political hostility between Greece and Turkey might tempt the Soviet Union and its Bulgarian surrogate to conceive of circumstances in which Turkish response to an attack on Greece could be discounted. Under such circumstances, the burden of deterrence of Bulgarian aggression would rest entirely on the Sixth Fleet" (Rivero70)

**1.1.3.The U.S. Security and Military Engagement in the Mediterranean**

The US has established different military bases all over the Mediterranean in NATO and non-NATO countries, which were composed of naval bases, air bases, army installations, intelligence, and strategic sites. Naval bases included Naval Support Activity in Naples, Italy; Naval Station Rota; and Souda Bay, Greece. For air bases, the Aviano Air Base, Italy, and the Incirlik Air Base, Turkey, were the most important besides the Wheelus Air Base in Libya. Army installations included Camp Darby in Italy and in a camp in Sinai Peninsula, Egypt. For intelligence and strategic sites, the US established listening posts in Cyprus and a Comiso Air Station in Italy. "The distinction between US military operations in the Mediterranean region outside the NATO framework has had critical political significance" (Zoppo79).

This claim indicates that the US had operated military bases independently based on national interests rather than alliance commitments, which made NATO displeased due to the complexity of the operations that had been made without taking into consideration regional stability, alliances, and Cold War strategy. The operations created political chaos between NATO and non-NATO contingencies, but the military actions were impossible to separate; therefore, they had to work in coordinated to keep the security balanced in the region, which blended the East-West rivalries with North-South economic and political problems.

The US Sixth Fleet remained in the Mediterranean even though it was not a part of NATO, which facilitated securing the region based on NATO rules and principles like having Algeria under their so-called NATO Mediterranean Command by France in 1949, which was a French colony at the time. Evanthis Hatzivassiliou discussed the Algerian protection by NATO claiming that

> "The Western Alliance was present in the basin apart from the coastal member states. In 1949 Algeria had been explicitly included in the guarantee of Article Five, and a NATO Mediterranean Command was set up in the early 1950s. The US Sixth Fleet, although technically not a NATO force, ensured Western air and naval predominance during the Cold War" (Zoppo16).

Here it becomes clear that the US and NATO alliance had shaped a great power and dominance over Europe, Africa, and America, which made it hard for the Soviet Union to spread communism in these regions.

**1.1.4.The U.S. Economic and Cultural Ties in the Mediterranean**

The US economy has appeared to be strong due to the Gross National Product (GNP), which is the total market value of the final goods and services produced by a nation's economy, beside the good living conditions that the Americans have as well as taxation. Yet, the high rates of GNP could mainly mean that the individuals are consuming, spending, or producing; therefore, the US economy might appear strong on the national surface while it is not. This paradox has been examined by economists who "point out that despite the

great expenditures the United States has been making in the foreign policy field and the constantly rising GNP and standard of living, the national economy has not been operating at peak efficiency" (Lerche 455).

On the other hand, the US foreign policy has been stronger due to the investments that were taken even from domestic investments because it is believed to be more important for national security and the country's economy. For instance, the US economic ties with the Mediterranean countries have helped in the emergence of the world's economy due to its efficiency in providing financial, military, and humanitarian assistance, which strengthens trade relationships that provide free trade and stability in the targeted region. "Foreign assistance policy is viewed as a mean to maintain an open and accessible economic system and as going hand in hand with reconstituting America's defense capabilities" (Zoppo2).

Consequently, America has held the position as a global power due to the political, economic, and military strategies that helped strengthen its roots all over the world.

**1.2.The U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East**

The US had many countries from the Middle East on its side during the Cold War.
The list consists of six countries: Iran (before 1979), Saudi Arabia, Israel, Jordan, Türkiye, Iraq (1980s), Egypt (1978), and Lebanon. The US foreign policy in the Middle East was more complex than its Mediterranean policy due to the struggles that the region knew, like the Arab-Israeli conflicts and the economic conflicts about oil. The US had made different plans over the years to support its Middle Eastern allies and solve the problems in the region. These included the Marshall Plan (1947), Eisenhower Doctrine (1957), Baghdad Pact (1955), Camp David Accords (1978), Carter Doctrine (1980), Reagan Doctrine (1980s), and the creation of US Central Command (CENTCOM) in 1983. "Eisenhower proclaimed American support for any Middle Eastern government targeted by overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by international communism" (Khalidi17).

The Eisenhower Doctrine was made based on the Middle East's need for economic and military aid, yet the Arab leaders were not convinced by the doctrine or the aid itself. The doctrine made deep roots in the

area, in which it helped shore up the Kingdom of Jordan and also military operations in Syria. Lebanon in 1958 had an internal political crisis, and Libya had to accept it to maintain its stability and independence Therefore, Lebanon and Libya were the only ones to rely on it unconditionally.

**1.2.1The Middle East's Strategic Importance to the U.S.**

The Middle East played a role as a battleground due to the opposition of ideologies in the region. Every country was trying to protect its borders, some from the Soviet Union and others from the United States, which led to interest conflicts escalating into major conflicts during the Cold War. "Both King Saud and Ali Jawdat, the Iraqi Prime Minister, were gratified by their improved relations with the radical camp, which had given their regions a respite from Egyptian and Syrian propaganda attacks. And while both Saud and Jawdat were alarmed by Syria's drift toward the Soviet orbit, neither was willing to take forceful reaction action to reverse it" (Yaqub115). Syria's geopolitical stance had created major conflicts and dilemmas in the Middle East by joining the Soviet Union due to its support for Arab nationalism and its refusal to accept the idea of creating Israel. Therefore, it was considered as a mole that should be removed or controlled in one way or another. But the conservative Arab states, Saudi Arabia and Jordan, refused to do it aggressively because it would lead to a confrontation between the USSR and the US, leading to wars and instability. Plus, they did not have a strong military base. On the other hand, Türkiye, which was a US ally that bordered Syria, was ready to take action against it to stop the spread of communism at any cost. Also, it had strong allies since it was a NATO member, and by doing so, the US was afraid of the Arab backlash, since Türkiye is a non-Arab country.

`On the other side, they hoped that this reaction would provoke Iraq and Jordan to make a move, yet they could not perform any action toward Arab countries, so they remained neutral. Türkiye stood back due to Soviet threats. After that, the UAR was created, which refers to the United Arab Republic that was composed of Syria and Egypt under the rule of Gamal Abdel Nasser.

> "When a sudden deterioration in relations between the UAR and the Soviet Union suggested that Nasserism might be a barrier to, rather than an avenue of, further Soviet penetration of the Arab world. The result of these developments was a UAR-American rapprochement that lasted for the rest of Eisenhower's term and into the Kennedy years" (Yaqub120).

The UAR, under Nasser's leadership, made it hard for the Soviet Union to gain full control. They were more like allies because Nasser refused imperialism and applied independent policies. Also, there were regional conflicts which made it a weak ally; therefore, the UAR shifted its position to the US.

**1.2.2The U.S. and OAPEC Relationships**

The US has played an important role in the OAPEC organization's policies during the Cold war period. The organization consists of many countries that produce oil and petroleum. It consists of Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela as founding members during 1960. It has other countries like Algeria, Angola, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Libya, Nigeria, and United Arab Emirates. The US relationship with the organization has been critical due to the oil embargo and the OAPEC leaders' misuse of the organization's power to make prices soars as the US, a key oil consumer, claimed. The US created what is called NOBEC to control the oil markets and prices. "The world was a different place not only because of the jump in oil prices but also because of Western perception of Israel-Arab oil power. The Arabs managed to focus international attention on Israel: if the latter behaved, then all would be well in the oil market and prices would fall" (Rivlin19).

The soaring prices created turmoil and rivalry for non-OAPEC oil producers. After this dilemma, the demands for oil started to fall, creating a vice versa situation, making countries like Saudi Arabia lower its price, and when it did, the consumers refused the deals.

**1.2.3The U.S. and the Arab-Israeli Conflicts**

The US has chosen the Middle East due to its geographical position, an intersection of Europe, Africa, and Asia. Thus, it insisted on creating Israel based on this latter, oil sources, and global trade routes, which made it gain more power. "The first phase of American diplomacy, from 1947 to 1967, was characterized by a remarkable number of initiatives in the Arab-Israeli arena. President Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson each brought distinctive views to the conduct of foreign policy in the region, but they were united to prevent the spread of Soviet influence, in managing if not resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict, and in bolstering ties with Iran and Turkey"(William63).

The US had many regional conflicts to solve, Arab-Israeli conflicts due to the Arab countries' opposition to the creation of Israel because they believed in Palestine and its independence. But the US reinforcement of Israel and supplying it with economic and military aid created tension, in which their support to Israel meant that the US was not applying what it said or supported, like anti-imperialism and independence movements.

During this period, the Palestinians wanted a self-determination policy, but the US and Israel refused it, which made the Palestinian case unresolved through many administrations during the Cold War Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and even Nixon. The Arabs control considerable oil reserves crucial for the United States has a special relationship with Israelis, the only democratic nation involved in the Arab-Israeli dispute" (Kim160). The Arabs' control over the oil made it more difficult for the US, but it managed to find other sources of oil in Africa, like Algeria.

### 1.2.4The U.S. Relationships with Iran and Turkey

Another conflict in the region was that of Turkey-Iran. Even though both countries aligned with the US foreign policy, but they had different views about Kurdish nationalism, regional influence, and resource allocation. "while both countries preferred to have separate dealings with the United States and its western

allies rather than developing shared political or economic positions through CENTO or the NATO or the European Union EU have tried to operate in recent years" (Bishku14).

The US intervention to end the conflicts between the two countries was limited due to the complicated dynamics of the region especially Iran. Thus, the US tried to influence their behavior to reduce the tension. The creation of CENTO, also called Bagdad Pact, in 1955 was meant to stop tensions in the area; it was created by Iraq and Turkey as founding members and included also the UK, Iran, and Pakistan with the US support. This pact reinforced U.S. and British influence in the Middle East during a sensitive period for the countries with the rise of Arab nationalism on one hand and the rising influence of the Soviet Union on the other. This pact which has worked mostly for the US was dissolved in 1979 after the Iranian revolution. CENTO programs had been implemented to provide for mutual defense of the areas as well as the economic development of the region" (Strategic Studies 9). The pact has helped in the economic, political, and military fields to provide security all over the region.

**1.2.5The U.S. and the Suez Canal Crisis**

The Suez Canal is in Egypt and it has a geopolitical location that made it a case of interest to the global powers in which it connects the Mediterranean with the red sea, it faced crisis in 1956 and made a huge turning point in history such as decline of European colonialism, from high imperialism to Cold War division. In the wake of the Suez Canal crisis "the United States faced a heap of shards in the Middle East. Its own heavy handed Cold War policy towards Nasser had triggered a chain of events that led to the American association at least in Arab minds, with Israeli and European imperialism" (Luthi 34). Nasser's policy had made huge impact on the future of Egypt and the middle east, this crisis set the middle east as a battle ground for the forthcoming Six-Days War that was between Israel and the Arab states.

**1.2.6The U.S. Military and Economic Engagement in the Middle East**

The United States military involvement in the Middle East was based on its need of containing the region by strengthening Israel, the only non-Arab country, which benefited from Kennedy's military aid in

1962. "the United States must possess military capabilities enabling it to prevail over a conceivable combination of adversaries" (Bacevich 126). Later events proved US takeover of the region especially that the Arab states could not succeed in their mission in destroying Israel in the six-days war in 1967 and the Yom Kippur war 1973.

The US also had created rapid development force in 1979. The United States had many military bases in many Arab countries and it also supported its allies during their conflicts at the time. "created to events in the region by creating the potential for a forward military presence. In addition to RDF, the U.S. operated naval and air base at DIEGO GARCIA in the Indian Ocean was upgraded" (Yetiv 47). This shows the reason behind America's military bases all over the world, where the presidents have used the foreign policy differently but all for America's interest and the global peace as they claim. Economically, the US economic aid was a key component of its foreign policy in the region, and among the countries that received aid is Turkey, Iran, Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen (North Yemen), and Saudi Arabia. Firstly, as part of the Marshall plan 1948, 15 billion Dollar went to Turkey. Point Four Program launched by Truman in 1949 had as an objective supporting US allies by providing technical assistance and economic aid which helped developing the rural areas and undeveloped countries of the third world.

> "basic to any consideration of conditions in the middle east is the fact that, in every country the population is predominantly rural, poverty stricken, and unreceptive to change. Any program aiming at the improvement of living standards must be concerned primarily with problems touching character, the tenure, and utilization of the land" (Hoskins 86).

Economic support funds 1970s and 1980s, the Camp David accords 1978 peace agreement between Egypt and Israel, food for peace public law were other financial aid packages. "While the cold war justified the way in which the two superpower blocs structured and organized their own economies, in the middle east the focus was on independence development and security against regional enemies and against direct and indirect international impositions" (Roberson 7).

The Middle East states tried to be independent by counting on oil and energy creating a strong economical foundation, yet it still got into conflicts globally as mentioned before. Also, the US focused mostly on its relationship with Israel than any other country.

**1.3Realpolitik versus Idealism in U.S. Foreign Policy**

The United States is widely regarded as the most powerful country in the world, a status largely attributed to its strategic decision-making and its ability to effectively manage key sectors such as healthcare, education, and foreign policy. American strength, however, does not stem solely from strict adherence to fixed principles. At various moments in history, U.S. leaders have recognized the need for a flexible and pragmatic approach, often adopting Realpolitik prioritizing practical interests over ideological commitments. As David D. Fidler observes, the U.S. has historically provided aid to combat HIV/AIDS in Africa, but such initiatives are frequently tied to political and economic conditions. Funding and engagement often align with strategic interests, such as maintaining regional stability, securing alliances, or countering the influence of China and other global powers (99). In essence, the U.S. uses health aid as a tool of diplomacy. By positioning itself as a global leader in HIV/AIDS relief, the country strengthens its influence in Africa while simultaneously countering rival powers. Fidler also introduces the concept of "racidemic," which suggests that the U.S. does not intervene in every humanitarian crisis unless it serves its national interests (99).

The United States shifted towards a realpolitik approach in the 1960s, particularly under the influence of Zbigniew Brzezinski, who later served as National Security Advisor to President Jimmy Carter. Brzezinski also succeeded in persuading Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson to adopt a strategy of "peaceful engagement" during the Cold War (Saaida 8). In other words, rather than relying on military force, Brzezinski advocated for the use of economic incentives, cultural exchanges, and favoritism toward regimes displaying signs of liberalization. This approach reflects the use of soft power in American foreign policy.

Another important figure associated with Realpolitik is Henry Kissinger, who played a crucial diplomatic role after the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. Kissinger convinced Israel to withdraw from the Sinai Peninsula, acknowledging the new political realities shaped by the oil crisis (Saaida 9). At the same time, the U.S. has provided significant support to Israel for decades. Dov Waxman confirms that for the past thirty years, the U.S. has given more financial aid to Israel than to any other country, with Israel receiving approximately $3 billion in military aid each year (Waxman 98).

This support does not come without its strategic benefits. In return, the U.S. maintains its influence in the Middle East, including control over vital trade routes. Needless to say, Israel possesses advanced military and intelligence capabilities, sharing valuable information with the U.S. Waxman also states that "Israel's relationship [with the U.S.] is more a love affair than simply a marriage of convenience" (Waxman 98), suggesting that their relationship is based on practical benefits and mutual gains, such as military cooperation, intelligence sharing, and strategic influence in the Middle East. *Idealism*, on the other hand, is defined as the theoretical position that phenomena and events exist only in so far as they are perceived as ideas. The idealist believes that thoughts are prior to actions, and that the mental or cognitive world is more important than the material world. Many U.S. presidents have used idealism as a strategy in their foreign policy. Firstly, we have Harry S. Truman (1945–1953): the Truman Doctrine (1947) and the Marshall Plan (1948) were based on an idealistic perspective. John F. Kennedy (1961–1963) supported and defended liberation movements and human rights, such as the Algerian case in 1957 in a speech under the title "Imperialism". *The Enemy of Freedom*. Jimmy Carter (1977–1982) initiated agreements like SALT II to reduce nuclear arms, and Ronald Reagan (1981–1989) supported solidarity in Poland. "It's clear, therefore, that U.S. State Department viewed Cold War security as significantly more important than idealistic humanitarian foreign aid programs during the period of the Peace Corps' creation"(Koerten 10). The creation of utopia was impossible to achieve due to the U.S.'s needs as a country where idealism does not exist; it has to use realpolitik in order to keep its status as a

global power. Kennedy's humanitarian ideology dissolved after he won the presidency, despite the fact that he was against Eisenhower's policy toward Palestine.

### 1.4.Colonization and Decolonization of Algeria: Historical Background

Over the decades, France and Algeria's relationship was primarily based on business and trade. However, as time progressed, France's aspirations became increasingly opportunistic, as it maintained a strategic interest in Algeria, waiting for the most advantageous moment to pursue its objectives. trade between the two regions had grown significantly, and the French conducted business in Algeria through La Compagnie d'Afrique (The Africa Company), established in 1714 (Bennoune) This company was required to pay fees to the Dey of Algiers and local authorities to conduct trade (Bennoune 30). However, as Michael Dudzik discusses in his article "The Fan Affair," the French failed to pay debts owed to the Dey, despite repeated requests. The Dey explicitly demanded repayment from France in a letter, writing, "We asked for the amount owed, which the French must pay. When the entire amount is ready, send it to us immediately, including any interest attached to it" (Dudzik 62). This unresolved financial dispute became a significant prelude to the French conquest of Algeria.

#### 1.4.1The Origin of the War

In 1827, a diplomatic meeting occurred between the Dey of Algiers and the French consul, Pierre Deval, to discuss state matters. During the meeting, the Dey confronted Deval about unpaid debts, but Deval responded in a disrespectful manner. Enraged, the Dey struck him with a fan. This act was considered a serious diplomatic insult, and France used it as an excuse to escalate tensions (Bennoune 31). Nevertheless, France used this incident as a pretext to justify its long held colonial ambitions, aiming to transform Algeria into a colony that would supply raw materials. Algeria held significant importance for France, as it was considered the gateway to the Mediterranean.

In 1833, the French government sent a commission to Algeria to evaluate whether colonization would benefit France. As stated by Bennoune, the report concluded that Algeria held economic, commercial, political,

and military value (Bennoune 35). French leaders, such as Jules Ferry, strongly advocated for colonization, arguing that industrial nations required expansion to remain powerful. He declared, "One cannot be a great power if one stays in one's own backyard" (Bennoune 35).

Algeria had long been seen as an economic prize for France (Evans 8). This claim is further confirmed by Naylor who reveals that Algeria was invaded not just for economic reasons but also to serve Bourbon political interests (Naylor 13).

On June 14, 1830, under King Charles X, the French army landed at Sidi Fredj with artillery and ships carrying 37,000 soldiers. However, soon after, King Charles X lost his throne and was replaced by his successor, Louis-Philippe, who found it more challenging to withdraw from Algeria than to dominate it (Evans 7). As a result, the French government divided Algeria into two regions: the north, which was treated as part of France, with cities like Algiers, Oran, and Constantine placed under civilian rule, and the south as explained by Prunty, Algeria was placed under military rule, known as the régime du sabre (the rule of the sword) (Prunty 21). This period was marked by harsh military governance and brutal repression. The French authorities did not merely aim to conquer land; they sought to maintain total control through fear and violence, targeting not only individuals deemed threats but entire communities.

After initial resistance, France officially settled in Algeria in 1834. European settlers, known as *pieds-noirs*, primarily from Spain and Italy, began taking over Algerian land. "By 1836, more than 14,000 European settlers had settled in and around Algerian cities occupied by the French military; by 1837, the settler population in the colony had risen to more than 100,000" (Brunty 22). These settlers dominate much of Algeria's wealth, relegating native Algerians to second-class status. Most Muslims and Arabs were denied political rights and subjected to harsh military rule.

Between the initial invasion in 1830 and the emergence of early nationalist movements France pursued its conquest deep into Algerian territory. A notable example is the 1844 expedition to Biskra, led by

the duc d'Aumale. This military campaign aimed not only to suppress the resistance of Emir Abdelkader but also to bolster the domestic prestige of the ruling Orléans dynasty (Brower 29). As Brower illustrates, such operations were designed to fulfill both imperial ambitions abroad and political objectives at home, as the French monarchy sought to legitimize its authority through colonial victories in North Africa.

**1.4.1The World Wars and the Rise of Nationalism (1945–1954)**

During World War I, France was engaged in a long conflict with Germany and relied heavily on Algerian soldiers, often sending them on dangerous missions. Despite their sacrifices, Algerians did not receive equal rights and continued to be treated as second-class citizens under the *Code de l'Indigénat*, a set of colonial laws that allowed the French to punish them harshly.

This mistreatment made many Algerians see independence as the only solution. Similarly, during World War II, Algeria's contributions to the French war effort were significant. Approximately 173,000 Algerians served in the French army, participating in major campaigns such as the Italian Campaign and the invasion of Southern France in 1944.

Additionally, hundreds of thousands of Algerians worked in factories to sustain the war effort, further highlighting their pivotal role in France's victories (Prunty 23). However, their participation in both wars made them increasingly aware of their lack of political rights. As a result, Algerian nationalists began organizing to demand independence. Leaders such as Farhat Abbas, Messali Hadj, Abdelhamid Ben Badis, and other nationalist figures played a crucial role in mobilizing the Algerian population. Initially, nationalists attempted to negotiate for reforms, but France refused to compromise, leaving them with no choice but to push for full independence.

On May 8, 1945, as Algeria celebrated the end of World War II, demonstrations were held in Sétif and Guelma, where peaceful protesters waved nationalist flags, green, white, and red, symbolizing Emir Abdelkader. However, French forces responded with extreme violence, opening fire on demonstrators and sparking widespread riots. This led to the deaths of approximately 100 European settlers. In retaliation, the

French colonial authorities launched a brutal crackdown, killing an estimated 45,000 Algerians, though French sources often cite a lower figure of around 15,000–20,000 casualties. (Prunty 29) This massacre, known as the Sétif and Guelma Massacre, was a key moment in Algerian history. It shattered any remaining faith in peaceful negotiations and strengthened the resolve of Algerians to fight for independence, eventually leading to the Algerian War of Independence (1954–1962).

**1.4.2.The FLN and its Diplomatic Strategy (1954–1956)**

By the 1950s, nationalist groups in Algeria were inspired by the Arab nationalist movement led by Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt. Many Algerians united to form the FLN (Front de Libération Nationale), which later became the main force in the struggle for independence.

On November 1, 1954, the FLN launched its first major attack against French colonial forces, an event known as All Saints' Day. At that time, France was struggling to maintain its empire, particularly due to the First Indochina War (1946–1954) and the devastating defeat at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu in 1954 (Paul et al 77). Additionally, France was losing control over Morocco and Tunisia, further weakening its colonial power.

The main purpose of the FLN was not just to engage in direct combat with the French but also to gain global attention. To achieve this, they strategically used media and other communication channels, including radio programs such as CBS broadcasts, Blair Clark's coverage, and the Tunisian based "Voice of Algeria" (Connelly 230).

Their efforts were successful in portraying the FLN as a leading example of an anticolonial movement Key figures like Hocine Aït Ahmed and Mohamed Khider played crucial roles in internationalizing the Algerian cause. Aït Ahmed represented the FLN at the United Nations and in international conferences, while Khider handled FLN diplomacy from Cairo. Additionally, Ahmed Ben Bella traveled across the Middle East and North Africa, securing arms shipments for the movement. When the FLN first emerged as a liberation movement, the anticolonial war received little international attention. At the time, most newly independent states were a minority at the United Nations, making it difficult for Algeria's voice to be heard. However,

figures like Khider persisted, and Saudi Arabia eventually petitioned the UN Security Council. Despite these efforts, most members of the Arab League remained neutral, arguing that Algeria's struggle was an internal French affair.

In November 1954, the FLN carried out a series of coordinated attacks on French security forces, targeting police stations, military bases, and communication centers. This marked the official beginning of the Algerian War of Independence. The FLN justified its actions by claiming to fight for Algeria's sovereignty, democracy, social justice, and autonomy based on Islamic principles. At the time, the FLN was poorly equipped, relying on hunting rifles, shotguns, and homemade bombs, which forced them to adopt hit-and-run tactics. However, their initial attacks did not go as planned. Many Algerians hesitated to support the armed struggle due to fear of French retaliation, and the French authorities initially did not take the FLN seriously. Over time the movement gained more assistance and support, particularly in mountainous areas around Constantine, Algiers, and Oran. By 1956, the FLN had developed well-structured military and civil committees, transforming into a more organized force. The FLN's movement was not limited to armed attacks it also sought to establish an alternative government. As the war progressed, the FLN gained significant international support. Egypt and Syria provided training and weapons, while other Arab League countries contributed financial aid. Morocco and Tunisia became safe havens for FLN fighters. By 1955, the FLN had shifted its strategy from military attacks on French forces to targeting colonists (pieds noirs) and Algerians who supported French rule.

On August 20, 1955, the FLN launched an attack near Philippeville, killing 123 civilians. In response, the French military carried out a brutal retaliation, killing 1,273 suspected guerrillas and Algerian villagers. The violence did not stop there; mass killings continued, resulting in the deaths of up to 12,000 Muslims, many of whom were innocent civilians. The French authorities justified these killings by applying the policy of "group

responsibility (Paul et al. 79) punishing entire traditional warfare, the FLN shifted its strategy. Instead of focusing on military targets, they began communities suspected of aiding the FLN. This massacre increased Algerian support for independence and deepened resentment toward the French colonial government.
The Soummam Congress was a turning point for the FLN, as expressed by Connelly, allowing them to establish international contacts and focus on weakening French rule**.** As a result, they set up eight offices in key cities**,** including Cairo, Damascus, Tunis, Beirut, Baghdad, Karachi, Jakarta, and New York (Connelly 228)**.**

Although Islam played an important role in Algerian identity**,** the FLN did not seek to be perceived as a pan-Arab movement. Their primary goal was to secure broad international support**,** particularly from the United States**,** rather than relying solely on Muslim or Arab allies**.**

The Cold War further shaped the struggles of Algeria. The Soviet Union openly supported Algerian independence, whereas the United States maintained an ambiguous stance**.** Initially, the U.S. backed France, but over time, its position shifted. American foreign policy took **a** dual approach**:** on the one hand, they contact with FLN representatives**,** while on the other, they advised France privately**.** Publicly, the U.S. preferred to remain neutral**,** as they were concerned about France's potential withdrawal from NATO and its growing tensions with the **S**oviet Union**.** During the UN debates on Algeria in December 1958**,** the UN officially recognized the GPRA (Gouvernement Provisoire de la République Algérienne) as Algeria's provisional government. At this critical moment, Connely also emphasize that the United States abstained from voting, unlike other countries (Connelly 233). This decision marked a turning point, signaling that the U.S. was no longer fully supporting France in the conflict.

**1.4.3.Escalation of the Conflict (1956)**

In response to the growing rebellion, France swiftly increased its military presence in Algeria. the number of French troops rose dramatically from 150,000 to 400,000 within a year. To suppress the uprising, the French launched a harsh counterinsurgency campaign, targeting FLN leadership and cracking down on anyone suspected of supporting the movement (Paul et al. 80). By 1956, realizing that they could not

defeat the French army through urban terror campaigns aimed at French settlers in Algeria.

On September 30, 1956, FLN militants launched a series of coordinated bombings in public places, marking the beginning of a campaign of urban terror. The attacks targeted locations frequented by French settlers, including two popular restaurants and the Air France terminal at the Algiers airport. In response, French authorities implemented a general strike, disrupting communication and transportation networks. The violence quickly escalated, with 800 attacks occurring per month, accompanied by widespread arrests and the imposition of curfews (Paul et al. 81). The French military resorted to brutal tactics, including widespread torture and secret executions. Suspected FLN fighters or sympathizers who refused to talk were executed in secret operations, known as "work in the woods."

**1.4.4Negotiation and Independence (1960–1962)**

Public opinion turned against France due to its brutality, damaging its image as a liberal democracy. Reports of torture and mass detentions further discredited France on the international stage. Meanwhile, the FLN continued to gain support, and the war in Algeria became a controversial topic at the United Nations. The Arab world, along with the United States and Britain, distanced themselves from France, threatening its arms sales and diplomatic relations. As the war escalated, France divided Algeria into military zones and stationed permanent troops. This static defense strategy reduced FLN attacks but failed to eliminate the insurgency.

The French government also established broad security measures, including the Morice Line and Pedron Line eight-foot electric fences illuminated by searchlights, surrounded by minefields and 40,000 troops. Despite these efforts, 85% of the stationed troops were killed. Between March and May 1958, 3,000 FLN guerrillas were killed, while 20,000 remained in Tunisia until the end of the war (Paul et al. 83). Politically, the FLN established a government known as the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic (GPRA) in Tunisia. In response, the French government introduced a new cabinet committed to negotiations, but the FLN

rejected their proposals. Consequently, the French army intensified its military strategy, launching "hunting commands" elite units that received assistance from U.S. supplies and helicopters. These forces used harsh counterinsurgency tactics to apply maximum military pressure on the FLN, aiming to force them into negotiations.

In December 1958, Charles de Gaulle introduced a referendum that extended voting rights to all Muslims in Algeria. His goal was to integrate Algeria into the French political system. Additionally, he proposed a five-year development plan to improve infrastructure, education, and social services while offering amnesty to the FLN. However, when de Gaulle proposed the "Peace of the Brave," the FLN rejected the offer, insisting on full independence.

After years of war, the United Nations debated Algeria's case, increasing international pressure on France. The FLN gained additional support from the Soviet Union and some Western nations, which strengthened its position. Between 1960 and 1962, the French government held secret meetings with the FLN, negotiating key issues such as the status of the Sahara region and Algeria's oil reserves, which France eventually ceded. In March 1962, a ceasefire agreement was reached between France and the FLN. Finally, in July 1962, France officially recognized Algeria's sovereignty, marking the end of 132 years of colonial rule**.**

**1.5 Colonization and Decolonization of Palestine: Historical Background**

The history of Israel is quite complex due to various factors, and different studies present Jewish history from diverse perspectives. This variation can be traced back to the earliest written documents. there is believed that Abraham, the son of Heber, was called by God to leave his homeland and travel to an unknown place, which He would reveal to him. He quotes, "Here we have no continuing city, but seek the one to come" (Moss 6). This means that instead of granting Abraham land and citizenship, God gave him promises known as the Abrahamic Covenant. This idea is also supported by other schoolers, one day God asked Abraham to leave his country with his people, travel to the land of Canaan, and establish a settlement there. However, when he arrived there, he found the land already inhabited by other people. Abraham had two sons: Isaac and

Ishmael. Isaac was regarded as the ancestor of the Jews, while Ishmael was considered the ancestor of the Arabs (Baskin et al) Furthermore, Isaac had a son named Jacob, to whom God gave the name *Israel* .In other words, the first generations of the Jewish people are referred to as Israelites. Baskin and Seeskin also state that Jacob and his family descended into Egypt, where they lived for centuries. Initially, they enjoyed peace and security, but over time, under various Pharaohs, their situation worsened. This continued until God sent a savior Moses who led them out of Egypt. After Moses passed away, Joshua became the leader of Israel. They claim, "The Israelites were not brought directly into Israel but wandered in the desert for forty years" askin et al 18).

The story of the Israelite exodus is also mentioned in the Quran. While the details differ from the bible, the Quran states that Allah punished them for refusing to fight for the land, making them wander for forty years. However, in the Bible, God unconditionally promises the land of Canaan to the Israelites without requiring any effort from them. As stated in the Bible:

> "Now the Lord had said unto Abraham, Get thee out of thy country, and from thy kindred, and from thy father's house, unto a land that I will shew thee; and I will make of thee a great nation, and I will bless thee, and make thy name great; and thou shalt be a blessing. And I will bless them that bless thee and curse him that curseth thee; and in thee shall all families of the earth be blessed. (Bible13) .

This passage claims that the Bible presents the land as eternally given to the Israelites. Nevertheless, some sources describe the Israelites' migration from Egypt to Canaan, but no Egyptian or external records confirm this. This raises questions such as: Did the biblical story happen exactly as written, or is it a later tradition?

The Jewish people were, at times, a displaced group moving from place to place in search of security and land. During the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the Ottoman Empire controlled much of the Middle East, including Palestine. Jewish immigration to Palestine began in 1882. However, since the Ottoman Empire

governed the Arab states at the time, it was aware of this movement and opposed the presence of Jewish settlers in Palestine (Mandel 1). Jewish immigrants were allowed to settle in scattered groups throughout the ottoman empire expect Palestine, not to live in center group and they have no privileges. The exclusion of Jews from Palestine was motivated by a combination of political, social, and economic factors. For example, Ottoman authorities feared that an influx of European Jews could weaken their control over the region and potentially fuel nationalist movements (Mandel 2-3).

In 1882, the Ottoman Minister of Foreign Affairs informed Jewish leaders, including Isaac Fernandez, that they were not permitted to settle in specific areas such as Syria, Palestine, and Mesopotamia. The empire sought to avoid adding another ethnic group that might lead to conflicts similar to those involving other minorities, such as Romanians and Bulgarians (Mandel 3) By 1891, the Ottoman government attempted to block Jewish immigration to Palestine, particularly targeting Russian Jews. However, this effort ultimately failed, and Jewish migration to Palestine continued despite Ottoman restrictions (Mandel 8).

The Ottoman Empire was at the end of its rule; that is, it was no longer in Arab countries' control. Meanwhile, Britain made multiple promises, one of the most consequential of which was the commitment to support a Jewish homeland in Palestine as it stated *in Balfour Declaration.* This promise materialized in the form of the Balfour Declaration on November 2, 1917. A letter written by Arthur, which is still being fought over more than a hundred years later, and the purpose of it is to create a Jewish homeland in Palestine. A month after Balfour's letter, British troops took Palestine, ending Ottoman rule Before this decision was made, Jews were spread all over the world due to the holocaust, and they were facing harsh treatment because of antisemitism. Governments and churches applied strict rules forbidding them from owning land. They even had to wear particular clothes that made them social pariahs. Over time, they increasingly believed that they ought to have a homeland.

### 1.5.1The Origins of Zionism and the Creation of a Jewish Homeland

The idea of building up a Jewish state goes back to the 19th century, when many Jews suffered horrific persecution, especially after Hitler and the Nazi regime. the nazis killed 80 percent of the 7,8 million jews (Adelman 65) The Holocaust made the need for a safe Jewish homeland urgent, so many felt that Palestine could be refugee Therefore, the Jewish presence in Palestine became known as the Zionist movement. This was a political movement that arose as a reaction to antisemitism, led by a man called Theodor Herzl. He depicted in his diary that "At Basel, I founded the Jewish state. If I said it out loud today, I would be answered by universal laughter. Perhaps in five years, and certainly in fifty, everyone will know it." (Herzl 581) this meant that at that moment, there was no Jewish state, but soon there would be. The Jewish community grew with big waves of immigration. At the beginning, Palestinians were welcoming and hospitable, especially with the first wave of immigrants.

Even Herzl noticed a "friendly attitude from the population" (qtd in Sayegh 39). However, with the second immigration, Palestinians shifted their kindness into suspicion. Zionists had their own schools, factories, and even their own militia in Palestine. It was clear that Britain was not delivering them independence; instead, it was delivering their country to other people. Britain was given a mandate over Palestine, and after it withdrew, Israel announced its independence on May 14, 1948. Soon, the U.S. and the Soviet Union quickly recognized the new country. That same evening, Egypt launched an air assault, and even Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq joined. This was the beginning of the war, also known as the Nakba crisis.

### 1.5.2The UN Partition of Palestine and its Consequences

After experiencing all the atrocities and persecution in Europe, Jewish people went and did the same thing to Palestinians. The conflict escalated within the state, especially among Jews and Arabs. On November 29, 1947, the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 181, which recommended dividing Palestine into two states: one Jewish and one Arab (Hammond 3). It also added that "Jews would get 55.5 percent of the land, while Arabs would get only 45.5 percent," ((Hammond 3) even though Arabs made up 66 percent of the population. this was an unfair partition, as most of the land belonged to Arabs. They owned 85 percent of

Palestine, while Jews owned less than 7 percent. The plan also proposed that Jerusalem become an international city, meaning it would not belong to either side. This decision made Palestinians and neighboring Arab countries furious, that leading them to firmly oppose the proposal.

After World War II, Palestinian independence was denied. In other words, many Arab territories under the Ottoman Empire became independent states through the League of Nations mandate system. However, Palestine was not given independence. Britain was given a mandate over Palestine, but Palestinians were never asked about their future or what independence should look like for them. After the UN Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) reported on the partition, another committee was created to further study the issue. "Contrary to the principles of the Charter, the United Nations had no power to give it effect." (Hammond 3). This meant that the UN did not have legal power to enforce partitions or create a new country. Thus, [smaller subcommittee focused on the legal side of the issue and reached several key conclusions for instance, the claim that both Palestinians and Jews had equal rights was not based on strong evidence and technically, since British rule was ending, Palestine should logically become an independent country. The future of Palestine should be decided by the people who live there, not by external forces. Finally, The UN could not take land from the Arab majority and give it to the Jewish people.

**1.6 Conclusion**

During the Cold War, U.S. foreign policy in the Mediterranean and the Middle East was shaped by the need to counter Soviet influence. To achieve this, the United States employed a mix of military and diplomatic strategies, including the Marshall Plan and NATO alliances, aimed at preventing the spread of communism. These efforts were not only about containment but also about securing American political and economic interests in the region. The U.S. became involved in significant independence movements, such as those in Algeria and Palestine, which were seen as part of the larger geopolitical rivalry between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

As a result, U.S. responses combined elements of idealism supporting freedom and human rights with Realpolitik, which emphasized practical and strategic goals. This blend of principles and pragmatism shaped American policy in the Mediterranean and the Middle East for decades, as the U.S. continually sought to balance its values with its national interests.

# Chapter Two

## John F. Kennedy: The Senator vs. the President

From the Senate to the White House, John F. Kennedy is often seen as a standout leader because of what he accomplished and his energetic style. He aimed to bring new ideas to his presidency, making it feel different from those before him. But his beliefs sometimes changed based on what worked best for his administration. While many linked him to themes of peace and freedom, his political moves didn't always match that image. This chapter looks at Kennedy's policies before and during his presidency especially how he approached Palestine and Algeria, fight for independence.

### 2.1Biography and Early Political Thought

John F. Kennedy was born on May 29, 1917, in Brookline, Massachusetts, and was tragically assassinated on November 22, 1963, in Dallas, Texas. His sudden death shocked not only the United States but also the world. The assassination left many questions unanswered, and even today, the true motives behind his killing remain ambiguous. Some theories suggest the CIA was involved, while others, such as scholar Don Peretz, have pointed to Zionism as a possible factor. However, there is still no concrete evidence to support these claims (Peretz 118). More recently, on March 18, 2025, former President Donald Trump authorized the release of nearly 80,000 pages of previously classified documents related to Kennedy's assassination, adding new material to a case that continues to spark public interest (Herb).

Kennedy, the second of nine children born to Joseph Patrick Kennedy and Rose Fitzgerald Kennedy, was the 35th president of the United States, serving from 1961 to 1963. He faced several foreign crises, particularly in Cuba and Berlin, but also achieved major accomplishments such as the Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty and the Alliance for Progress. Before his presidency, Kennedy published a book titled Why England Slept, based on his Harvard senior thesis. At the age of twenty, he joined the U.S. Navy and served in World War II.

"Commanding the Patrol Torpedo Craft (PT) USS PT 109, Lieutenant, Junior Grade, John Kennedy and his crew participated in the early campaigns in the Allies' long struggle to roll back the Japanese from their conquests throughout the island chains of the Pacific Ocean" ("John F. Kennedy in World War II"). After their boat was destroyed in combat, Kennedy led his surviving crew to a nearby island, where they endured several days before being rescued. Despite suffering serious injuries, he was awarded the Navy and Marine Corps Medal. He returned home a national war hero, though the war had also brought personal tragedy with the death of his older brother, Joseph Kennedy.

Following his military service, Kennedy entered politics. In 1946, he won a seat in the House of Representatives and served three terms (six years). As a congressman, he focused on working-class issues and economic justice, including workers' rights, labor unions, minimum wage increases, unemployment insurance, affordable housing, and Social Security expansion. By 1952, Kennedy was elected to the U.S. Senate, where he continued to build his political legacy.

He advocated for U.S. support of newly independent nations such as Algeria, supported the Civil Rights Act of 1957, and backed labor protections and federal aid. He also promoted health insurance for the elderly and gained national recognition with his Pulitzer Prize-winning book Profiles in Courage (1957). "John F. Kennedy was becoming a popular politician." (McMillen) in 1956, he was nearly chosen as the Democratic vice-presidential nominee. Kennedy nonetheless decided to run for president in the next election.

It is widely believed that Kennedy was never meant to be president his father had originally planned for his older brother Joe to pursue the presidency. However, after Joe's death, that responsibility shifted to John. Within the Kennedy family, this succession appeared hierarchical: a win was still a win, regardless of the change in candidate. By the beginning of 1961, John F. Kennedy won the presidential election against then-Vice President Richard Nixon.

He became the first Catholic president and the eleventh Democrat elected to the office. He served from 1961 until his assassination in 1963. As recorded "As it was passing the Texas School Book Depository, gunfire suddenly reverberated in the plaza. Bullets struck the president's neck and head, and he slumped over toward Mrs. Kennedy. The governor was shot in his back (JFK Library) This tragic event marked the end of a presidency that had achieved much and left a lasting legacy in U.S. history.

Kennedy's interest in politics developed early. Even while serving in World War II, his mind was on political issues. Unlike his peers, who would relax with card games, Kennedy often discussed foreign affairs. One friend recalled, "Oh, yeah, he had politics in his blood…" (Dallek 113). In 1941, while working in Washington, he began compiling material for a manuscript on isolationism versus internationalism. He believed American foreign policy should be practical and flexible rather than extreme. During a tour of post-war Germany, Kennedy witnessed the devastation of war and the challenges of reconstruction. He also met influential global leaders such as President Harry Truman, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, British Prime Minister Clement Attlee, and Soviet official experiences that strengthened his belief in his own political future (Dallek 114).

Kennedy's swearing-in to Congress on April 22, 1946, marked the beginning of a much larger ambition: the presidency (Douglass 16). Dallek supports this view, noting that Kennedy's father described his son's election to Congress as "little more than a first step" (Dallek 135).

Kennedy did not intend to stay long in the House of Representatives. He saw it as a stepping stone to the Senate and eventually to the presidency. Although he respected a few older Congress members, he often found many to be uninspiring and opposed to change. At times, he echoed Mark Twain's famous statement: "Suppose you were an idiot. And suppose you were a member of Congress. But I repeat myself" (Dallek 136). Yet Kennedy appreciated the status that came with representing more than 150 million Americans.

Kennedy's political career was shaped by his desire to prevent future wars. When he ran for Congress, he emphasized peace and warned of the dangers of nuclear conflict. In May 1946, he reported from the United Nations Conference in San Francisco, an experience that reaffirmed his belief that politics was the means to preserve global peace (Douglass 12). During his travels across post-war Europe, Kennedy met a British officer imprisoned for refusing to shoot civilians a meeting that deepened his admiration for individuals who upheld human rights. His diary reflected concern over atomic weapons, especially after hearing of the New Mexico bomb tests.

Kennedy feared that such weapons might one day lead to humanity's destruction. Though he initially envisioned himself as a peacemaker, the growing pressures of the Cold War would later challenge this vision.

**2.2.Kennedy in the Senate (1953-1960)**

John F. Kennedy was a Democrat, which is one of the two major political parties in the United States. His principles aligned with the Democratic Party's goals during the Cold War era, including containing communism, promoting international development, supporting moderate civil rights reforms, strengthening labour protections, backing the United Nations, and promoting American moral leadership abroad through diplomacy and foreign aid.

As a humanitarian, Kennedy advocated foreign policies aimed at advancing global economic development, particularly in Third World countries, drawing inspiration from initiatives like the Marshall Plan. He supported efforts to promote world peace and backed independence movements, aligning with Cold War strategies to counter Soviet influence while fostering political and economic stability.

**2.2.1Senator Kennedy and Algeria**

By the end of the Second World War, The French government killed more than a million and a half Algerian citizen. They required them to fight to their side during World War II promising them freedom by the end of the war, but France reneged on its promise to the Algerian people leading to tragic consequences for the

Algerians. On the 8th of May 1945 a Serie of massacres has started in Guelma and Setif. After two years the cold war has started there was a shift in the world's policies, liberation movements, nationalism, self-determination revolutions became supported by the two global powers the US and the USSR.

The United States has supported many nations in gaining independence particularly in north Africa, as a part of its foreign policy to secure and gain the full control over the Mediterranean Sea and contain the spread of communism by attracting newly independent nations as allies due to the cold war ideological division. while President Dwight D. Eisenhower showed full support for decolonization movements, but he remained neutral concerning the Algerian case because it was under the sovereignty of one of its allies France, the president René Coty maintained that Algeria is more than a French colony it was part of France

> "The Truman and Eisenhower administrations accepted the French argument that due to the settlement of almost a million Europeans in Algeria, it was a permanent part of the French State. A violent independence movement revolted against France in the 1950s, and Bouteflika was one of its leaders" (Smith 2022).

The American administration accepted France decision due to the cold war geopolitical alliances in which it prioritized supporting its allies over supporting anti colonial movements. While The Algerian people were fighting to gain self-determination, the senator of the white house John F Kennedy has made notable efforts to support the Algerian cause, despite that the president asked him not to delve in such crisis because the former colonizer of Algeria is a key NATO ally, therefore their job was to support France or remain neutral. Kennedy's opposition to French imperialism was also based on human , military ,and financial loss that the French government has caused, if France were to go through a war, it will drag all NATO allies with it, it was a losing battle, the final image of this war was obvious due to the Algerian revolutionists, who refused to give up on their land, they were determined to gain their freedom, despite losing millions of their people men, children, an omen "In June 1956, when French COIN forces executed two FLN fighters by guillotine, the FLN

leadership took a more radical turn, vowing that for every FLN fighter executed, 100 Frenchmen would meet a similar fate and thus commit-ting to even more violent attacks against civilian target" (Hoffman 58) the tragic consequence of colonial violence left no room for peaceful dialogue, forcing the Algerian people to fight with fire for their independence, dignity, and right to exist.

As a senator, Kennedy pursued different approaches from the president Eisenhower, guided by his humanitarian perspective defined by the oxford dictionary connected with helping people who are suffering and improving the conditions. The senator Kennedy witnessed the struggle of the Algerians to gain independence over a century with no remarkable result; he chose to interfere and support the cause by spreading facts and awareness about it even the congress Kennedy's 1957 Algeria speech:

> At the time Kennedy addressed the senate, he was well aware that its complexities were very bit as real as those that formed the international context indeed, in different elements of American society, such as in the press and in academic communities, differing views prevailed. So too the US Congress was sharply divided, largely along parties, on the subject of colonialism" (Cleva 29).

The French occupation in Algeria became a daily ordeal more like a routine, yet the Algerian people have fought to gain their independence, despite the crucial circumstances and the sufferance that France has created. "Kennedy, the senator had reproached the Eisenhower Administration for having renounced the American anti-colonial tradition and for providing arms to repress the local people" (Barkaoui 33). Many people had died during the French Algerian War, it became necessary to end this war, even though there was a chance of creating a world dilemma, yet Kennedy participated in freeing Algeria, to save the name or the image of America as the symbol of freedom and democracy. The senator has participated through media and speeches; he was an active politician; he knew how to deal with the media to drag people's attention.

Senator Kennedy's speeches about the French Algerian case were perceived as a public criticism of the French government and its policies, which Kennedy could not tolerate nor stay silent about, on July 2, 1957, he made a speech addressing the importance of freedom and decolonization: "The most powerful single force in the world today is neither Communism nor capitalism, neither the H-bomb nor the guided missile it is man's eternal desire to be free and independent. The great enemy of that tremendous force of freedom is called, for want of a more precise term, imperialism, and today that means Soviet imperialism and, whether we like it or not, and though they are not equated, western imperialism"(JFK Library) At the beginning of his speech Kennedy addressed broadly the concept of imperialism. since it was a cold war era there was no justification for military interventions on any nation, it was a period where nations were being rebuilt not devastated following the aftermath of the second World War.

After Kennedy's speech the Algerian case became a global concern, their resistance highlighted the brutality of its colonizer, yet the French occupation was insisting on making Algeria a part of its national territory even though this war was a war of attrition with catastrophic consequences for both sides, but France refused to surrender. The dilemma intensified, the Algerians could not solve nor resist, although the president Eisenhower supported Algeria with economic supplies, yet he backed France with military aid which reflects the complexity of the United States foreign relations and the cold war embargo.

The French were not to remain passive. They reacted. French generals, who could not afford losing another war like Indochina war, led a putsch. Such possible loss positioned them on the weak side despite France being a strong key NATO ally, how could not it afford to control or manipulate third world countries? The French wanted to gain the right into having French Algerian nationality "Still obsessed with the idea of military victory over the F.L.N., the French generals in Algeria led a putsch against their government, which they accused of being too lenient toward the rebels" (Barkaoui 34). the French colonials were furious they

refused any negotiation or political solution to solve this dilemma they just wanted to possess the Algerian land; there was an obvious contradiction between the politicians and the national army of France was in denial they could not accept the fact that this war will end with the Algerian glory.

The retired general Charles de Gaulle sent a letter to Senator John F. Kennedy claiming that the Algerian case is none of his business in a sharp tone and asked him to shift his attention to something more important because Algeria is going to be a French territory sooner or later claiming:

> "Read this paper, John, and try to understand why we have nothing to do with your ideas about Algeria. It appears from what you said that your knowledge in the matter is strictly limited, poor young fellow, by what you heard from the Arabian and Tunisian foxes, who, on the sly, as everyone except yourself knows, work for communism and Soviet imperialism" (de Gaulle 1957)

The French politicians and journalists were very upset about Kennedy's stance; they wrote articles and condemned him and sent formal diplomatic notes to the government in Washington : "In Washington, the French ambassador, Hervé Alphand, called on Secretary of State Dulles to react to the speech in order to make its effects on France less harmful. Dulles held a press conference and urged that if Kennedy wanted to opposite French colonialism, he should focus more on communism rather than France. (Nadjet 35) Ambassador Alphand tried to reduce the damage by reaching to the white house, Kennedy's speech has created a pressure on the French government, which led the us government to hold a press conference to protect the US French alliance, and shifted the attention to the concept of communism, in this situation we see a clear reflection of realpolitik by the US government and idealism by John .F Kennedy. "He asked how the Algerians would look out to America when they obtained their independence, while America assumed neutrality and at the same time provided weapons to their enemies. Then, he urged that the world fight imperialism, and the scale of nationalism was the most powerful element for foreign policy"(Barkane 36). The French government was

frustrated by Kennedy's actions, publicly the US government appeared to be supportive to its allies but privately working for its colonies favour, yet the French considered the Algerian
case as an internal problem and refused interference of any country even the United States. On the other side, Kennedy gained popularity in the Arab world, Asia, and Africa, the leaders of liberation movements, journalists, and diplomats praised his courage and clarity and sent him numerous letters of support, he took unusual step of responding personally despite having many affairs to deal with, this letter were saved in Kennedy's historical archive (Maatoug) The senator engagement shows a genuine commitment to the cause which made The Algerian nation more than thrilled by his support of their revolution, they even gave him the name The Algerian senator because he was the first one to truly stand for the Algerian cause, this nickname reflected the Algerian stance on his position which shows gratitude of the Algerian nation.

**2.2.2Senator Kennedy and Palestine**

In 1939, Kennedy visited Palestine, which was under the rule of the British Monarchy at the time. Based on his observations, he criticized Britain for its policies concerning the Jewish immigrants, the two different promises that it gave to both nations but did not commit to both The 1917 Balfour Declaration addressed by Arthur Balfour to Lord Rothschild was a promise to give the Jews the Palestinian land, on the other side they promised the Palestinians independence if they rebel against the Ottoman Empire which created a clear division between the Jews and the Palestinians, during World War one. Palestine wanted self-determination, while Zionists wanted a land of their own, they already started making individual businesses their side was more economically stable. Which created a sense of tension in the area.

Kennedy also suggested an official partition two different nations and leaders on the same land would solve the problem, but Britain did not take time to interfere in their domestic affairs. In a letter he wrote to his father Joseph Kennedy, the 22 years old John Kennedy expressed sympathy for the Arabs, he demonstrated that "this is not only because the Jews have had, at least some of their leaders, an unfortunately arrogant,

uncompromising attitude, but they feel that after all, the country has been Arabic for the last few hundred years, and they naturally feel sympathetic. After all, Palestine was hardly Britain's to give away" (Kennedy 1939). Neutral, he described what he saw based on his analysis, but the Jewish leaders were not ready to compromise with the Arab leaders even after the Arab revolution (1936-1939). After a decade, the Arab Israeli War 1948 (also called the Nakba by Palestinians) has almost created an end for the Palestinian people, many of which were expelled or fled to other countries which made the Jewish population represent 71% of the overall population.

Despite his early neutrality, Kennedy in the senate (1953 - 1960) showed his position about the Palestinian case through his speeches, in which he praised and supported Israel despite the sufferance and the inequality that the Palestinians faced and that was due to the cold war strategies, and for the benefits of America's foreign relations and affairs which was entitled America Salutes Israel:

> "I join in this salute today because of my own deep admiration for Israel and her people an admiration based not on hearsay, not on assumption, but on my own personal experience. For I went to Palestine in 1939, and I saw there an unhappy land, ruled under a League of Nations mandate by a Britain that divided and ruled in accordance with ancient policy"(Kennedy 1956)

Senator Kennedy supported the Israeli efforts that created a vivid land, which served Americas geo-economic interests western access to oil and its strategic location in the middle east which would help creating stability in the region under the control of the US and communism containment.

Kennedy's stance with the Arab world and his strong relations with the Arab leaders, especially Saudi Arabia and Jordan, "During his previous career in the US Senate, Kennedy had proposed a UN and World Bank-administered Middle East Resource Fund to help developing Arab countries and shield them from communist infiltration."(Moubayed) Kennedy worked on improving the situation in the Middle East for better living conditions, education, life level, economy, etc., and he was thrilled when the Jews had plans on

improving the situation in Palestine, but they had to make it theirs first. In this speech John F. Kennedy stated, "America Salutes Israel," I propose that an international effort be made to limit an arms race in the Middle East with a realization-with a realization that if this is not accomplished, we shall not permit an imbalance to exist that threatens the right of any country to self-defense." (Kennedy 1956) Kennedy maybe respected the rights of every single country to fight for their land and self-determination, yet he proved his stance on the Palestinian case in which America will stand with Israel.

Remarks of senator john f. Kennedy at the convention of the Zionist organization of America, "The Israelis surrendered their 1956 victory only because the United States and the United Nations committed themselves to the fulfillment of a pledge of free transit in the Suez Canal. So, this is a United Nations resolution in which we have a particular moral obligation."

Israel won a military victory in 1956 during the Suez Canal crisis, and America promised that it would give it free access through the canal, so morally America had to give it that right; thus, Egypt never allowed Israel access to its land. Israel reacted quickly and captured the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza Strip creating a new dilemma which made Eisenhower interfere in their actions "Eisenhower was neither reluctant nor afraid toimpose sanctions on Israel, as he did in 1953, and, while Kennedy supported Israel's desire to gain more territories, again, during the 195657 Suez Crisis, he even threatened Israel with expulsion from the UN" (Kuzmarov 5). President Eisenhower was not afraid to show intolerance of Israel's actions; in all this chaos, he remained neutral to keep the global peace.

In New York City in 1960, Senator John F. Kennedy has made another speech concerning the Zionist and the Palestinian case entitled Zionists of America Convention, "The Middle East needs water, not war; tractors, not tanks; bread, not bombs. There is already little enough available in the way of financial and

physical resources for either side to be devoting its energies to huge defence budgets" (JFK Library) Kennedy's first goal was peace and freedom for all the world's nations, yet to achieve peace people must be united; they

should choose and accept peace no matter what the result is. In the Palestinian case, the result is obvious: the citizens must lose their rights in gaining back the freedom of their land and settle for half of it. He also shed the light on the toxic environment in the Middle East; instead of fighting, they should have worked on flourishing it. Senator Kennedy different position on what he wants and what must be achieved were different due to the complexity of the situation in the Middle East, he also mentioned in the same speech Peace is our objective in the Middle East, and peace is the objective of Israel, and peace is our responsibility in part. "Seek peace and pursue it," says the Psalmist. And that we must do open up our minds and our hearts, and we shall seek peace for ourselves and all who share our aspirations. (Kennedy 1960) The Arabs and Israeli stance The Arab leaders and nations were united in opposition to Senator Kennedy's support for Israel, with Egypt, under Gamal Abdel Nasser, taking a leading role in the Palestinian cause. Nasser actively engaged with Kennedy through letter exchanges and firmly rejected the U.S. stance on the Palestinian case. Syria, first under Adib al-Shishakli and later Khalid al-Azm, aligned closely with the Soviet Union after America's position. Iraq, under King Faisal II and later Abd Al-Karim Qasim following the 1958 revolution, remained a frontline Arab state in the military confrontation against Israel.

In Jordan, King Hussein limited direct engagement with the U.S. due to tensions over American support for Israel. Saudi Arabia, under King Saud and later King Faisal, opposed Kennedy's pro-Israel stance politically, yet it maintained strong economic ties with the U.S. for strategic and oil-related reasons. Lebanon, ruled by Camille Chamoun and then Fuad Chehab, aligned with the Arabs opposition In North Yemen, Imam Ahmad bin Yahya voiced support for the Arab cause, as did Sudan under General Ibrahim Abboud and Libya under King Idris I, both backing te Arab position on Palestine.

Eisenhower and its foreign policy team were working on solving the Palestinian question by providing economic and humanitarian aid, but the problem was political, "he sent the king-crane commission to investigate facts in Palestine and the commissions confirmed the right of Palestinian people to self-determination. However, the us administration overlooked this right, while welcoming the idea of establishing a national homeland for the Jews and Palestine (Little 254).

The U.S. needed to balance support for Israel with preventing Arab alienation to block Soviet influence. U.S. Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles was sent to the middle to east to find a solution for this dilemma he visited Jordan, Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. His purpose was to convince the Arab leaders to absorb the existence of the Palestinian refugees on their lands, but the Arab leaders refused this settlement stating that they belong to their home Palestine and negotiated that the Israeli must Withdraw from territories taken in 1948 and Allow Palestinian repatriation, but the Israeli leaders refused this deal because they feared facing existential threat. In October 1953, following Dulles visit to the Middle East, the United States has sent another representative Eric Johnston, in which to mediate a regional agreement over the Jordan River water resources he aimed to regulate the tension between the Arab nations and Israel, according to Douglass little in his book American Orientalism,

> "the Israelis Johnston informed Eisenhower on 17november, were essentially receptive to the U.S proposal. Although the Arabs were publically calling for resistance to collaboration with Israel, privately Jordans king Hussein and Lebanon Camille Chanoun were willing at least to consider an economic develpement package" (Little 273).

The plan was convincing it was a technical acceptance, yet they did not sign the last agreement due to political rejection they refused to compromise with Israel, on the other hand Jordan's acceptance of the plan was for pragmatic reasons it needed water and wanted to keep its relations with the US, the plan was applied

quietly to avoid Arab backlash therefore it held its chair in the Arab league and still opposed to the existence of Israel.

The only Arab country who held a firm position on the Palestinian cause was Gamal Abdel Nasser who served as prime minister and president during john f Kennedy senate years, he supported Palestinian resistance groups (fedayeen), signed the Czech arms deal with the Soviet bloc, marking Egypt's turn toward the USSR, rejected the Johnston Plan, nationalized the Suez Canal, leading to the Suez Crisis 1956 which led to military action by Israel, Britain, and France, yet Nasser became leader of Arab nationalism in 1960, fighting for the same cause over the years:

> "Despite the long odds, Anderson made a second trip to Cairo in early March. As before, however, Nasser rejected the idea of face-to-face talks, with ben Gurion, insisted that Israel must give up the most of Negev, and welcomed growing restiveness among the refugees, who had no interest in a compromise with the Jewish state. None of this came to a surprise to Eisenhower"(Little 275)

President Eisenhower sent Robert B. Anderson to negotiate with Nasser to mediate peace he mediated a conference with the prime minister of Israel David Ben-Gurion, but Nasser refused to meet up with him maintaining Egypt's policy of non-recognition of Israel.

Also insisted on the Negev desert as a part of the deal which would minimize the Israeli territories in the land, he also wanted to sustain a solution for the Palestinian refugees, highlighting that the us stance on the Palestinian case was unacceptable in the Arab world.

**2.3.Kennedy in the White House (1960-1963)**

As President, Kennedy's principles were not entirely the same as when he was a senator. In the Senate, his views were largely shaped by idealism, but once he became President, he had to approach every decision

with greater caution and strategic thinking. This raises a central question: did Kennedy continue to act as he did in the Senate, or did the responsibilities of the presidency force a change in how he made decisions? The following section will explore whether his leadership style remained consistent or evolved in response to the demands of the office.

**2.3.1President Kennedy and Algeria**

The 1960s were a period of global change shaped by Cold War strategies. During this time, the idea of self-determination spread widely, and Algeria was a notable example. Major powers such as China and the United States recognized that Algeria deserved independence.

However, the U.S. position was not entirely clear and remained ambiguous. Algeria paid close attention to the United States, particularly after Senator John F. Kennedy gave a powerful speech advocating for Algerian independence.

Algerians were hopeful that Kennedy would win the presidential election, believing it would benefit their cause. One journalist who visited an FLN guerrilla camp in the Atlas Mountains was surprised to find fighters eagerly asking about Kennedy's chances of winning. On election night, they gathered around radios and cheered for Kennedy's victory (Connelly 215). Similarly, Barkaoui that while Algerian nationalists initially had high hopes for Kennedy's administration, once he became president in 1961, his responsibilities changed. He could no longer act as an independent voice due to the need to preserve the NATO alliance with France and avoid antagonizing Charles de Gaulle, who had just returned to power and was managing a delicate situation in Algeria (Barkaoui 89). As a senator, John F. Kennedy was deeply critic of French colonialism in both Algeria and Vietnam, recognizing that it was unsustainable and ignored legitimate nationalist movements. However, his administration later adopted a more ambiguous stance. In 1951 Kennedy visit Indochina, and he realized that the French were making a serious mistake by trying to maintain control over a country that

clearly wanted independence. Yet, this view changed once he took office particularly after meeting French President Charles de Gaulle. During their meeting, de Gaulle warned Kennedy against U.S. involvement in both Algeria and Vietnam, saying: "I predict that you will sink step by step into a bottomless military and political quagmire no matter how much you spend in men and money (Nurse 326). In other words, De Gaulle cautioned that any American military intervention in colonial conflicts would be difficult to exit. Despite this warning, the United States later became deeply involved in Vietnam, and even in Algeria, though less publicly. As Barkaoui highlights, on April 3, 1961, the U.S. quietly began direct talks with the Algerian Provisional Government (GPRA). These talks were kept secret because the U.S. did not want to upset France, its close NATO ally. A U.S. official, Walter N. Walmsley Jr., met with Algerian representatives Hafid and Mhamed Yazid in Tunisia. This meeting revealed that, while the U.S. publicly supported France's position, it was also privately building ties with Algerian nationalists in anticipation of Algeria's eventual independence (Barkaoui95).

This illustrates the contradictory nature of U.S. foreign policy: on one hand, the U.S. publicly supported France its NATO ally and avoided openly endorsing Algerian nationalists; on the other hand, it us was meeting with Algeria provisional government to build a relationship with them even though France strongly opposed that. President Kennedy met with Ambassador Mongi Slim in January 1961 and promised that his administration would work toward a peaceful resolution to the Algerian war. While Kennedy expressed his respect for Charles de Gaulle, believing the French president would end the war peacefully, but still he "maintained almost a complete public silence on Algeria" (Lefebvre 66). At the same time, de Gaulle brought back an idea he had previously proposed to President Eisenhower: the creation of a three power leadership group within NATO that would place France on equal footing with Britain and the United States in global strategic decisions. Kennedy, however, rejected this plan as well. During the 1961 French military coup attempt

in Algeria commonly referred to as the Algiers Putsch and therefore rumors circulated that the U.S., particularly the CIA, had supported the effort. As Barkaoui notes, Kennedy moved quickly to reassure de Gaulle, that US support French policy and admire de Gaulle democratic solution, Nevertheless, Kennedy also attempted to engage with Algerian aspirations indirectly. He visited Tunisian President Habib Bourguiba to encourage peaceful negotiations between the FLN and France. He hoped that he could influence the FLN to be more open to dialogue, the white house even promised economic help to the Algerian if the negotiations succeeded. Despite these efforts, the Kennedy administration's caution frustrated the Algerians. As Lefebvre reports, on October 7, 1961, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs G. Mennen Williams met secretly with two leaders of the Algerian Provisional Government in Tunisia. The Algerian officials expressed disappointment, criticizing the U.S. for appearing to support de Gaulle rather then recognize the Algerian independence directly (Lefebvre 73). Similarly, during the May 20, 1962 clashes over the partition of the Sahara, Kennedy's administration remained publicly neutral, but hoped that "expressing the hope that that was only a suspension and not a failure of the negotiating process" (Barkaoui 35). This cautious optimism suggests that Kennedy still believed a peaceful resolution was possible.

The main purpose of Kennedy's administration was to avoid being seen as fully supporting colonialism, particularly in the context of Cold War politics. As Lefebvre explains, on January 6, 1961, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev delivered a speech framing national liberation movements like Algeria's as anti-colonial and anti-capitalist struggles, which the Soviet Union should actively support. Eisenhower had ignored this rhetoric, but Kennedy viewed it seriously, seeing such movements as a potential tool for Soviet influence (Lefebvre 68).

Consequently, when Algeria declared independence on July 3, 1962, the U.S. was prepared to recognize the new state, but only after France had done so. Once French recognition was official, the U.S.

followed immediately. In his formal statement, Kennedy declared: "This moment of national independence for the Algerian people is both a solemn occasion and one of great joy. The entire world shares in this important step toward fuller realization of the dignity of man" (Kennedy).

**2.3.2President Kennedy and Palestine**

The relationship between the United States and the Jewish state is based on various factors, including religious, economic interests, and shared strategic goals. The U.S. has supported Israel for decades and continues to do so. One example is President John F. Kennedy, who was the first American president to provide Israel with weapons, further strengthening the alliance between the two nations. However, at the same time, Kennedy also made efforts to support Palestinian refugees, introducing a certain contradiction in his Middle East policy. To better understand his position, it is necessary to look back, as a friend of his, shares many facts about Kennedy's foreign policy. From the very beginning, Kennedy showed interest in international affairs, particularly the conflict between Arabs and Jews. At some points, he did not fully align with Zionism. He questioned whether the Balfour Declaration was legitimate, stating, "I doubt that Great Britain had the power to issue the Balfour Declaration" (Weinstein 10). He also expressed skepticism about the existence of a Jewish homeland, remarking, "I don't believe that a Jewish homeland can exist and be self-sufficient in [a] huge Arab sea" (Weinstein 10).

These doubts prompted his friend Lew Weinstein to send him many documents and books 17 to persuade him. As Weinstein recalls, "I sent Kennedy books, articles, and a letter of about a dozen pages; we had telephone talks, and it was clear that he read everything in the big bundle I had sent" (Weinstein 10). Afterward, Kennedy, Weinstein, and others held meetings to discuss these issues. Kennedy raised many questions, one being, "How could a Jewish Palestine exist with Arabs and the Mediterranean completely surrounding it?" (Weinstein 10) This shows that JFK was thinking critically about international law and regional stability. However, it also shows how Zionist advocates worked to convince him. His friend

answered using historical and pragmatic arguments, explaining that "Arabs like King Abdullah once welcomed Jews" (Weinstein 11). Eventually, Kennedy was persuaded, saying,

> "I'm convinced that you're right. I think that a democratic Jewish state is what America needs in the Middle East" (Weinstein11). On Sunday evening, June 14, 1947, Kennedy made a speech supporting the establishment of a Jewish state, declaring, "It is my conviction that a just solution requires the establishment of a free and democratic Jewish commonwealth in Palestine" (Weinstein12).

After John F. Kennedy took office, particularly during his 1,000 days as president, he supported Israel while trying to maintain good relations with Arab nations. Kennedy attempted to draw Egypt away from Soviet influence by offering economic and other incentives to Egypt's leader, Gamal Abdel Nasser. However, supporting Egypt which Israel considered an enemy due to Egypt's refusal to recognize Israel's existence could upset Israel. To manage this, Kennedy strengthened U.S. ties with Israel. In other words, to avoid misunderstandings, he supported Israel through military aid and diplomatic assurances. As Abraham Ben-Zvi states, "President Kennedy emerges in terms of his basic attitudes and policies towards Israel as neither a villain nor a hero, but essentially as a cold, calculating, and unsentimental statesman" (Ben-Zvi 226). This means that Kennedy's attitude toward Israel was not emotional or ideological; he was not strongly for or against Israel but made decisions based on U.S. national interests. Kennedy addressed the issue of Palestine by stating that refugees should be allowed to return to their homes and live peacefully with their neighbors (Bustami 102). Kennedy sent several letters to Arab leaders such as Gamal Abdel Nasser, King Saud of Saudi Arabia, King Hussein of Jordan, and the presidents of Lebanon and Iraq. This is also confirmed by Bass who notes that these letters aimed to build trust and reduce hostility in the Middle East, especially at a time when many Arab leaders were suspicious of U.S. support for Israel. As Kennedy emphasized, "I want to be certain that you and other

leaders have no misunderstanding of our attitudes towards the Arab people" (Bass 75). On May 30, 1961, Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion met with Kennedy to discuss two main subjects. First was the Palestinian refugee problem, for which Kennedy proposed three solutions: repatriation allowing some refugees to return home, resettlement settling some in Arab countries, and immigration moving some to other regions. Kennedy stressed that if refugees returned, Israel's security would be preserved. However, Ben Gurion reacted negatively, arguing that Arab states would not accept anything less than full repatriation, which Israel opposed because it would threaten the Jewish majority. Eventually, BenGurion agreed in principle (Bustami)
The second major issue was Israel's secret development of nuclear capabilities at Dimona. When U.S. intelligence discovered this, Kennedy took the matter seriously and stressed that nuclear technology should be used only for peaceful purposes. Ben-Gurion assured Kennedy that Israel's nuclear program was solely for research and energy.

Nevertheless, Kennedy insisted on U.S. inspections of the Dimona facility to verify that no weapons were being developed. Although Israel eventually agreed to limited inspections, this issue remained a point of tension between the two countries. Warren Bass also argues that during his conversation with Kennedy, Ben-Gurion repeatedly emphasized Egypt's leader, Gamal Abdel Nasser, as the greatest threat, stating, "they would do to the Jewish what Hitler did" (Bass 75).

This highlights that resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict required first addressing Nasser, who was seen as the main leader of Arab opposition against Israel. Consequently, any support Kennedy provided to Egypt could threaten Israel's security. Nevertheless, Kennedy chose to support Egypt economically. As Abraham Ben-Zvi states in his article Stumbling into an Alliance: John F. Kennedy, "In October 1962, when the administration decided to provide Egypt with US$432 million of Public Law (PL) 480 assistance over the next three years" (Ben-Zvi 232), that is to say Kennedy's administration publicly praised Israel while secretly

working to improve relations with Arab countries that Israel considered enemies. In other words, Kennedy's foreign policy was shaped by Cold War strategies. In September 1962 the president invited 20 Jewish American leaders to a meeting at the White House. During the meeting, Kennedy hugged one of the leaders tightly and asked to meet with him privately in the Oval Office. There, with a map of the Mediterranean on the wall, Kennedy gave a detailed talk, emphasizing that America needed Israel as a strong ally (Weinstein) This is also confirmed by Goldman "Kennedy sought to build a strong, safe, stable, and free society that would resist communist aggression" (Goldman 42). For the first time, Kennedy agreed to sell HAWK missiles to Israel. After the meeting, Kennedy invited Lewis Weinstein again and told him he was very happy with his speech to the Jewish leaders. Some sources suggest that JFK's support for Israel also had political motivations linked to his presidential election. For example, when Kennedy met privately with Prime Minister Ben-Gurion, he reportedly said, "I was elected by the Jews of New York, I have to do something for them, I will do something for you" (Bass 55). Ben-Gurion responded, "You must do whatever is good for the free world" (Bass 55) While the U.S. waited for the approval of the missile transfer, on October 1, an Israeli daily newspaper published a cartoon showing President Kennedy giving Israel a HAWK missile while Nasser smoked a cigar labeled "offensive rockets." The Israeli cartoon depicted Nasser looking at Kennedy's gift and saying, "I would like one of those instead" (Bass 182).

This suggested that Israel still desired more powerful weapons, like those possessed by Egypt. Although this frustrated American officials, the U.S. continued to maintain strong support for Israel. In December 1962, Kennedy met with Israeli Foreign Minister Golda Meir in Palm Beach and assured her that the U.S. relationship with Israel was "as close as it was with Britain."

**2.4Conclusion**

John F. Kennedy political evolution from the senate to presidency of the White House was shaped by idealism and strategic alliances and the burden of the cold war dynamics in which the United States was a global power that had control almost all over the world. As a senator Kennedy vocal support for Algeria and Palestine highlights his humanitarian approach toward oppressed nations. His bravery and bold criticism of the French government made him close to people from all nations especially in the Arab world.

However, his transition to presidency marked a change in his political ideology and stance where he embraced realism over idealism to balance the world power and contain communism. His administration took a cautious approach to the Algerian war. On the other hand, in the Palestinian case, he chose to support Israel which made the Arabs compromise against the American government, yet he was able to maintain peaceful relations with Arab leaders to provide safety and economic aid to the Middle East. Kennedy administration during the cold war has reflected duality in his foreign policy geopolitical interests that captured his realism and moral principle that captured his idealism. Though not always consistent but he made efforts to promote for peace and navigate the complexities of Cold War politics, which made his legacy one of kind that impacted the world history.

# Chapter Three

## A Comparative Study of John F. Kennedy's Decolonization Policy toward Algeria and Palestine

John Kennedy played a remarkable role during the cold war both as senator and president, navigating new path to contain communism and keep the world's peace using both idealism and realism in U.S foreign policy. As senator Kennedy emphasized the importance of idealism in solving crisis, marking the US as liberal and idealistic country by supporting revolutions and independence movements. During his presidency Kennedy leaned more toward realism, that was shaped by the cold war tension such as bay pigs' invasion, Cuban missile crisis, and Berlin crisis, these major events placed him in a sensitive position as a president and liberal leader. Therefore, Kennedy's presidency was shaped by shaped by this duality creating contradiction about Kennedy's ideological stance.

### 3.1The Case of Palestine: Humanitarian Concern or Domestic Political Pressure?

Kennedy once said, "Mankind must put an end to war or war will put an end to mankind". In this statement, he stresses the urgent need to end war by any means necessary, highlighting his belief that peace should be actively pursued by all nations showing that using war as a means of solving conflict was no longer acceptable. Needless to say, this quote is deeply idealistic, reflecting Kennedy's effort to promote peace and reduce nuclear threats.

However, despite his idealism, Kennedy's actions sometimes contradicted his peaceful rhetoric. Notably, he was the first president to approve the sale of advanced weapons, such as Hawk missiles, to Israel. This decision demonstrates a shift from his idealistic goals, showing that achieving peace required more complex and, at times, conflicting approaches. Again Kennedy addressed the issue of peace in his speech on June 10, 1963, declaring, "What kind of peace do we seek? Not a Pax Americana enforced on the world by

American weapons of war" (Kennedy). In this statement, Kennedy rejected the idea of peace being forced upon the world through U.S. military power. Instead, peace can be built in a respectful and diplomatic way; however, his foreign policy, especially in the Middle East, reveals a sense of contradiction. Dennis Ross advocates that the Eisenhower administration distanced itself from the problem of Israel, while President Kennedy considered this approach a complete failure. Some administrations argued that assisting Israel would weaken relations with the Arab world. However, Kennedy's government proved it could handle both situations effectively. A key example of this is when U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk met with Crown Prince Faisal of Saudi Arabia, and on the same day, the U.S. announced an arms sale to Israel. Faisal did not criticize Rusk or threaten to sever ties with the U.S.; instead, his primary concern was Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser, whom he viewed as the greatest threat and sought U.S. assistance against. (which one of the presidents who was toughest on Israel) This situation underscores Realpolitik, but the Realpolitik of Arab countries who publicly supported Palestine but ultimately choose the side that served their own interests.

Kennedy, from the very beginning of his political career, understood how important it was to win the support of America's many ethnic groups in order to get elected and remain in office. This awareness stemmed from his own background he was Irish American, and his family strongly valued their ethnic identity. He realized that support from Jewish, Irish, and Italian Americans was essential for electoral success Therefore, one of his early political moves was to meet with Jewish leaders and ask how he could gain their support, showing his early interest in building alliances (Bickerton) Kennedy was concerned about whether he would receive strong support from Jewish voters due to the fact that his father was unpopular among many Jews. Moreover, Kennedy was Catholic, and some people were suspicious or feared that he might hold anti-Semitic views. However, he was liberal and democratic both qualities that attract many Jewish voters. A key figure in helping Kennedy gain support from the Jewish community was Hirsh Freed, an influential local leader. In this

way, John F. Kennedy's early views on Palestine and Israel were shaped by a small but influential group of American Zionists, like Freed and others.

They advised him, educated him on the issues, recommended relevant literature (such as Bartley Crum's Behind the Silken Curtain), and even influenced whom he should or should not associate with publicly (Bickerton). This raises questions such as: what if Kennedy had not been influenced by these individuals would his views have been the same? It is unlikely that Kennedy would have developed the same pro-Israel stance on his own without this influence. Perhaps his later support for Israel, including the 1962 sale of Hawk missiles, might have evolved differently or more slowly. Thus, the guidance from Jewish advisors shaped not only his political views but also his timing and strategic alliances.

Anter Hmadi goes almost in the same direction, arguing that Kennedy's stance Toward Israel was clearly supportive. The United States tended to support Israel with the expectation of reciprocal strategic or political benefits. states, "Kennedy emphasized that Israel's friendship was related to a certain party and its national commitment" further asserting that "the protection of Israel [was] a moral and national commitment" (Hmadi 256).

However, this special relationship was fundamentally based on mutual interest. While Kennedy attempted to strike a balance in the Arab-Israeli conflict, his administration consistently favored Israel. Needless to say American-Israeli relations grew significantly stronger during his presidency. (Hamdi) Kennedy was not only the first president to support Israel publicly but also the first to establish this special relationship.

the Hawk missile was important not only because it was the first major weapon system provided to Israel, but also because Israeli soldiers needed to be trained in the United States, which increased Israel's dependence on American arms. Between 1948 and 1962, the U.S. gave very limited and mostly secret military aid to Israel. Even pro-Israel lobby groups in the U.S. those individuals who try to influence American policy

were unaware of this aid shared strategic plans; rather, it was done quietly and primarily for its own reasons. At the same time, the U.S. was also secretly providing military assistance to Arab countries in the Middle East. This shows that the United States was not assisting Israel based on any formal agreements or shared strategic plans instead it was done quietly and primarily for its own reasons. At the same time, the U.S. was also secretly providing military assistance to Arab countries in the Middle East. John F. Kennedy had a notably insightful diplomatic approach that managed to satisfy both Arab countries and Israel. In other words, instead of directly supplying weapons, the U.S. encouraged countries like France to sell arms to Israel. This allowed Israel to build its military strength without provoking Arab opposition to U.S. foreign policy. Israel's ambassador to the United States, the main source of arms for Israel at the time was France not America. This illustrates how the United States worked behind the scenes to maintain a balance in the region, although in practice that balance was more symbolic than effective (Eban) Little argues that Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy were the first to build strong ties with Israel, and that their main goal was not to win votes at home, but to ensure long term stability in the Middle East. For Eisenhower, concern arose over the Soviet Union gaining influence in Muslim-majority countries; as a result, he began to view Israel as a useful ally. Kennedy, meanwhile, became cautious when he learned that Israel might soon acquire nuclear weapons. to prevent this and to keep Israel secure, Kennedy sent advanced weapons and promised U.S. support if Israel were attacked by Arab countries. However, despite his efforts, after Kennedy's death, Israel continued to develop these dangerous weapons (Little) This highlights the contradiction of the United States while it was strongly opposed Israel acquiring nuclear weapons, yet at the same time, it authorized arms sales to Israel. In other words, why help a country build military strength if you're concerned it might pursue weapons of mass destruction? This can be interpreted as a humanitarian concern if Israel achieved nuclear capability, the likelihood of war and the risk of catastrophic consequences for millions of civilians would increase. Needless to say, this would make diplomatic conflict resolution more difficult. It could also push Arab countries to develop their own nuclear

programs, either for self- defense or to maintain regional power. and to stay powerful that what threat the US most because, if the Arab countries become powerful there is no need for US support, and therefore US would lost credibility as a peacemaker because it was concerned not just about security but also it is influence.

The U.S.–Israel relationship became complicated even before the Hawk missile request was approved. One source of U.S. frustration was Israel's retaliatory attacks on Palestinian refugee camps in Jordan and Syria, which Israel claimed were sheltering guerrilla fighters. And after one particularly violent raid on Syria, the U.S. joined the United Nations in criticizing Israel's actions. This shows that Kennedy was not afraid to publicly criticize Israel, and he was not blindly loyal to it (Little) As mentioned in the previous section regarding Kennedy's attention to the refugee crisis, Douglas also asserts that Kennedy asked UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld to assign the refugee issue to Joseph Johnson. Johnson then spent nearly a year conducting shuttle diplomacy, traveling between different regional leaders in search of a compromise (Little). This shows that Kennedy was not solely focused on military or nuclear matters he also deeply cared about humanitarian issues. Although his approach was diplomatic and cautious, he made significant efforts to address a sensitive problem. For example, he even convinced the Prime Minister of Israel that ignoring the refugee crisis posed both moral and diplomatic dangers. This effort reinforced Kennedy's broader image as a leader concerned with international justice and human dignity.

At the same time, Kennedy understood that if no progress was made on the refugee issue, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser might use it to stir up trouble. Conversely, by keeping Nasser diplomatically engaged with the United States, Kennedy helped contain Soviet influence and expansion in the Middle East. On April 17, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser announced a new Arab alliance with Syria and Iraq, aiming to fight for the liberation of Palestine. The next day, Palestinians in Jordan demanded that King Hussein join the fight against Israel. President Kennedy did not want Israel to respond too aggressively. However, the Israeli Prime Minister warned that the Middle East crisis was extremely serious and hinted at a possible Israeli

attack on the West Bank unless the U.S. could guarantee regional stability. In other words, Kennedy had to make a difficult choice: either to support Israel publicly which could anger Nasser and push the Arab nations closer to the Soviet Union or do nothing, which might lead Israel to act unilaterally and attack the West Bank, risking a large-scale war.

Kennedy ultimately chose a middle path. Instead of sending U.S. troops directly into Jordan, he ordered the deployment of U.S. Navy ships and troops near the eastern Mediterranean Sea, close to Jordan (Little). This move was a clear signal that the U.S. was prepared to intervene if the situation escalated, offering King Hussein protection without provoking further conflict. Kennedy's strategic decision helped maintain a fragile balance between humanitarian goals and the prevention of war. In May, he made a public statement: "We support the security of both Israel and her neighbors" (Little 571). This was a carefully calibrated act of diplomacy, balancing Israeli security concerns, the Arab alliance, and Cold War dynamics.

**3.2The Case of Algeria: Support for Decolonization or Cold War Geopolitics?**

During the Cold War era, the United States supported various liberation, independence movements, and revolutions. However, this support was not always grounded in moral consistency or idealistic principles, but rather shaped by the geopolitical context of the Cold War. The U.S. prioritized strategic alliances and realpolitik over its proclaimed commitment to freedom and justice. Its neutral stance on the Algerian War of Independence, despite advocating for decolonization, it revealed a fundamental contradiction in its foreign policy.

This position was perceived less as support for liberation and more as a calculated move driven by the fear of Soviet expansion. Consequently, American foreign policy toward Algeria was marked more by pragmatism than by moral clarity which reveals that Cold War strategic interests and fear of Soviet expansion have controlled its commitment to liberation.

The Algerian War of Independence (1954–1962) was one of the major cases under the struggle of the decolonization movement during the Cold War era, due to its geopolitical position and Cold War complexities. These factors placed the United States and the Soviet Union in constant competition to attract newly independent nations across the world. To contain communism throughout North Africa and the Mediterranean, the United States had to offer economic aid to Algeria while also providing military aid to France to maintain alliance since France is its NATO ally, also to create a balance of power over the area.

However, the U.S. stance on the Algerian War of Independence has been criticized for its inconsistency. Because president Eisenhower remained neutral about the Algerian case which does not align with America's motto liberty and justice for all.

Algeria and the fall of the fourth French republic the French government was in internal turmoil that have affected it domestically and internationally:

> "The unstable fourth republic was perfectly capable of creating a serious crisis in American French diplomatic relations which were very troubled by the Algerian conflict and appeared at times on the brink of collapse threatening at least NATO's military integration and in a hypothetical worst case the whole structure of post war European politics built in response to the cold war" (Irwin 592)

Despite France's political instability, it remained a strong NATO ally. At the same time, it was determined t retain Algeria, despite the broader efforts by both the United States and the USSR to support decolonization and attract newly independent nations to their respective ideological camps capitalism or communism. France's internal political instability created complications in its relationship with the United States. As a result, the American administration chose to remain neutral on the Algerian issue to avoid diplomatic tension with France, preserve NATO unity, and contain the spread of communism in the region.

Senator John F. Kennedy took a different stance. In his speech "Imperialism: The Enemy of Freedom", he openly opposed colonialism and emphasized that every nation has the right to freedom. Kennedy adopted an idealistic approach that contrasted with the prevailing realpolitik of U.S. foreign policy, highlighting the moral contradictions in America's position during the Algerian War of Independence. In this case there was a debate between ideological principles and geopolitical pragmatism one that was brought to light by John Kennedy in his senate years through his speeches and efforts to support Algeria, which created a global dilemma that had exposed the contradiction of the US foreign policy.

Senator Kennedy in his speech in July 1957 strongly showed his opposition to French colonialism and called for peaceful resolution, although his opposition created a sense of dilemma in home and in France, yet he was supported by Arabs for his morals and principles.

> "Kennedy's Algeria speech, therefore represents a counterpoint to existing policies an alternative to the bipolar rigidities of the cold war. This alternative might have allowed the nation to achieve a greater versatility in its foreign policy and diplomatic practices, as well as reconciliation between its competing anti-Communist and Anti colonialist propensities" (Cleva'19)

Kennedy have contradicted the us foreign policy and created a third path that does not align neither with the United States nor the Soviet Union, it was a humanitarian, moral approach based on justice, if the US have taken Kennedy's approach it would have created a peaceful atmosphere where other nations would not have to fight for independence roughly in other words the U.S could have supported freedom and justice without betraying its anticommunist commitments.

Kennedy's speech has provoked various reactions in the United States, France, Arab world and third world countries. In the United States President Eisenhower asked Kennedy not to interfere because such reaction would disrupt the French American relations, his approach was too idealistic for cold war

contingencies. In France the leaders and the public were furious the saw it as a challenge to its sovereignty due to its political instability, and inability to control its colonies. In response Charles de Gaulle has sent Kennedy a letter asking him not to interfere in France politics and relations. However, in the Arab world Kennedy was praised for his bravery and moral principles, he gained popularity and was perceived as a friend, similarly in third world countries and nonaligned nations supported him for his morals, he did not take the case based on strategic importance but based on humanitarian approach.

The emergence of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) created a sense of fear within the United States and the Soviet Union; it was founded in 1961 with the view to advancing the interests of developing countries in the context of Cold War confrontation. This movement created a third way, which offered an ideological and diplomatic alternative. Most of its members leaned toward socialism but not communism. This third way emphasized the necessity of decolonization, sovereignty, and economic justice, without needing the U.S. nor the USSR.

After Algeria's independence in 1962 President John F. Kennedy recognized the new government and extended economic aid. His administration saw Algeria as a potential ally in the region, balancing Cold War interests with support for self-determination. On this occasion Kennedy congratulated the president of the newly independent republic Ahmed Ben Bella. After Algeria's independence it became a key member of non-aligned movement, which was seen as suspicious by the us administration they feared that it would adapt the Soviet Union ideology communism. "Algeria was thus able to consolidate its development strategy, free of binding commitment to one side or the other, and to further its ambitions to be a leader of the Non-Aligned Movement and the Third World"(Ghettas 4).

`Algeria was able to use its strategic location to its favour Mers-El-Kabir naval base and its position on the Mediterranean made it significant for both powers, yet it remained not aligned neither with the US nor the

USSR, being an active member in the NAM tangled its relationship with the United States that helped it in gaining independence. Algeria oil sources, strong position in the Nam and its support for revolutionary movements especially its support for the Palestinian case made it under the scope during the cold war period. The third path forced the U.S. to balance between its ideals and its interest. Therefore, the Algerian case captures the us contradictions in its foreign policy that proclaimed ideals of liberty and justice yet remained neutral on this cause due to cold war strategies. However, senator Kennedy introduce a new approach for the world idealism.

**3.3An Analysis of U.S. Policies on Algeria and Palestine under John F. Kennedy**

The Middle East emerged as a battleground during the Cold War due to its strategic location and abundant natural resources. At this time, Arab nations like Algeria and Palestine were struggling for independence. John F. Kennedy became a vocal supporter of these movements, delivering numerous speeches including his well-known Algeria speech in which he advocated for self-determination. While his stance could shift depending on strategic interests, Kennedy consistently criticized imperialism. He believed that global movements for independence from colonial rule were inevitable and would continue with or without communist involvement. Therefore, he argued, the United States should support this wave of liberation rather than align itself with European colonial powers merely because they were American allies. For Kennedy, failing to support independence movements especially to maintain good relations with nations like France was a betrayal of America's founding ideals (Anders).

Kennedy's positions on Algeria and Palestine were complex, shaped by Cold War dynamics and domestic political pressure. His attention to freedom in the Middle East earned him respect among many Arab nations. although Kennedy sought support from Jewish voters during his campaign, his early backing of Algerian independence in the 1950s gained him admiration from Arab nationalists. On a personal level, Kennedy's

combination of idealism and pragmatism, along with his charismatic leadership style, appealed to Arab leaders such as Gamal Abdel Nasser. In this way, JFK embodied a unique blend of advocating for freedom and justice while maintaining a realistic, strategic foreign policy (Nadelmann) Kennedy's main concern was to improve U.S. relations with the Middle East. His foreign policy appeared to strike a careful balance neither too soft nor too strict. According to Dean Rusk, and as recalled by Israeli official Shlomo Gazit, who was in Washington during the Kennedy administration, the president was thoughtful and cautious someone who carefully considered the long-term effects of U.S. policy. Gazit noted that Kennedy's administration was open-minded and responsive to Israel's concerns, seriously considering every proposal brought forward. He even recalled that President Kennedy once shared a parable about a farmer who was planting trees that would take twenty years to grow. When someone asked, "Why are you working so hard when it will take such a long time for these trees to grow?" the farmer answered, "That is why I must work in haste" (Bickerton 77). This story symbolizes Kennedy's view that the goals of his administration such as peace, national security, and alliance-building could not be achieved overnight. Rather, they required huge time to prepare for future with care and intent.

Although Kennedy strongly opposed colonialism particularly in the case of Algeria he remained notably silent on Israel's occupation of Palestinian territories. As Paul Zingg points out, "Kennedy said relatively little about this and said nothing about Israel's rule" (Zingg 15).

This statement was made during Kennedy's public support of Algerian independence, which illustrates a contradiction: while he was vocal in criticizing French colonialism, he refrained from mentioning the harsh actions of Zionist expansion. This suggests that his administration, guided by geopolitical alliances and political calculations, often avoided criticizing Israel even when doing so conflicted with his stated principles. In April 1963, Israeli official Shimon Peres visited Washington to discuss Israel's security concerns with U.S. leaders. Peres directly requested more American weapons and a clear public guarantee that the U.S.

would intervene if any Arab state attempted to alter Israel's borders. He stressed the urgency of this support due to instability in Jordan. When Peres met President Kennedy in person, he repeated this demand, but Kennedy reminded him that he had already made a private assurance to Israel's foreign policy minister and was reluctant do not go with it publicly (Little). This shows Kennedy's cautious diplomacy: he understood the domestic and international risks of making such commitments publicly and acted discreetly to maintain a balance. Similarly, while Kennedy took a firm stance as a senator against French colonialism in Algeria, he became more cautious once he entered the White House. As Sabeel Rahim Berny explains, the Kennedy administration did not take an active role in the Algerian especially in Sahara conflict, choosing neutrality in what was seen as a sensitive negotiation between France and the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic (PGAR). This hesitation may have been driven by economic interests particularly the discovery of oil in the Sahara, which attracted attention from American oil companies. This made U.S. officials more cautious about interfering in France's handling of the region. The French, in turn, grew suspicious of potential American motives, fearing that the U.S. aimed to replace their influence in North Africa (Berny).

In a February 1959 interview, when Kennedy was asked why he had not spoken out on Algeria since 1957, he responded, "I had refrained because I think it is unhelpful" (Lefebvre65). That is to say, He considered each of his public actions carefully Some officials within the Israeli government believed that the United States prioritized its relationships with Arab countries over its alliance with Israel. They feared that U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East was primarily influenced by oil interests and a desire to avoid hostility Arab states. However, ShlomoGazit disagreed with this view and noted that President Kennedy demonstrated clear support for Israel not just passive backing, but visible and reliable commitment (John F. Kennedy and Israel) Similarly, Murphrey observes that the French politician Jacques Soustelle, a hardline supporter of French Algeria, accused the United States of being motivated by economic interests. Soustelle argued that the U.S. was not

genuinely concerned with peace in Algeria, but rather sought to gain control of Algerian territory and its Sahara oil reserves (Murphrey).

President Kennedy was concerned that supporting France's colonial war in Algeria could weaken NATO. The United States had provided weapons to France as part of NATO's collective defense strategy to protect Europe, but France was using those weapons in Algeria a misuse that undermined the alliance's credibility. (Paul) Needless to say that maintaining Algeria as a colony made NATO oppose freedom and self-rule. Identical, Kennedy feared that overt support for Israel could provoke Nasser and alienate Egypt. Therefore, he sought to improve diplomatic ties with Egypt. But Israeli officials were uncertain how to interpret this move, debating whether it might harm their security or, or benefit them.

In May 1961, William Porter, a key figure who had helped Kennedy draft his 1957 Algeria speech, was appointed U.S. Consul General in Algeria. That same year, another U.S. official secretly met with FLN representatives at the United Nations to encourage them to enter negotiations with France (William). This demonstrates that the United States was attempting to build relations with the FLN without provoking France much like its strategy with Egypt, where it sought to improve ties with Nasser while avoiding open confrontation. Robert Komer, one of President Kennedy's key advisors, reassured Israel that the real threat to its security was not American food or financial aid going to Egypt, but rather the Soviet Union. Through this strategy, the United States hoped that Nasser would value the American relationship enough to avoid actions that might threaten regional stability or provoke Israel (Nadelmann). A similar logic applied to the case of Algeria. If the United States failed to support nationalist movements like the FLN, it risked pushing them toward communism. As Paul Zingg explains, Kennedy warned that "moderate people become extremists, extremists become revolutionaries, and revolutionaries become communists" (Zingg 16–17). To sum up supporting for Algeria independence and Israel at some point was not humanitarian concern it is also become intentional way to shape his image as a future president, with strong moral and global vision. By advocating for

self-determination in Algeria while carefully managing U.S. relations with Israel, Kennedy positioned himself as a leader who could address complex international issues with both principle and pragmatism.

**3.4Idealism vs. Realpolitik in John F. Kennedy's Foreign Policy**

Kennedy's actions reflect a clear application of realpolitik, as they were driven by regional stability, Cold War priorities, and the advancement of American interests. In other words, the United States was willing to support foreign nations primarily when doing so served its strategic purposes. Kennedy aimed for careful balance between support for Israel and maintaining relations with the Arab world, avoiding any action that could provoke unnecessary escalation. To achieve this balance, Kennedy ought to engage with Gamal Abdel Nasser, whom he viewed as the most influential Arab leader of the time. As Hassan Kennedy actively sought to build constructive relations with Nasser through consistent diplomatic correspondence and by signing cultural and investment agreements (Elbahtimy). This approach demonstrates Kennedy's dual focus: while supporting Israel for security and political reasons, he also sought to improve ties with Egypt in order to maintain influence over rising Arab nationalism.

This strategy shows how Kennedy tried to carefully balance different interests. By giving aid and building good relations especially with Egypt the U.S. wanted to stop the Soviet Union from gaining more power in the Middle East, which was very important during the Cold War. At the same time, Kennedy was also worried about the spread of weapons, especially nuclear ones, because they could be threaten the US interests and make the regionmore unstable. Although Kennedy made efforts to address tensions between Israel and the Arab states, his administration paid little attention to the dilemma of the Palestinian people. thus Kennedy did not push strongly for Palestinian rights, maintain domestic political Isreal relations took priority over Palestinian nationalism. And therefore Kennedy's engagement with the Palestinian issue was not driven solely by humanitarian concerns but instead by a broader geopolitical objective: preventing Soviet

expansion into the region. In this context, Kennedy's attempts to build trust in the Palestinian sphere were part of a wider Cold War strategy.

Moreover, when the U.S. sold weapons to Israel during Kennedy's time, it was a smart political move, but it went against the ideas of freedom and self-rule that he often supported.

This shows that Kennedy focused more on practical decisions than on always sticking to his ideals. In the end, his foreign policy was shaped by the need to protect U.S. power in a tense and changing region, even if it meant giving up some moral values to reach strategic goals. On the other hand, Kennedy's idealism in the Algerian case was shaped by cold war contingencies, he shed the light on the cause using speeches creating a third path for the world to follow, he framed the case as a moral issue criticizing both the American government by Eisenhower and the French government by de Gaulle, his speech remained a key symbol of freedom and liberty in which he claimed "The most powerful single force in the world today is neither Communism nor capitalism, neither the Hbomb nor the guided missile – it is man's eternal desire to be free and independent."(Kennedy 1957) this speech was one the significant speeches in the us and the world history impacted positively the colonized land, by in the same time tangled the French American relations.

"Kennedy considered his Algerian speech to be an important statement indeed, we mentioned that he made it his first major foreign policy speech since being appointed to the senate foreign relations committee in January1957." (Cleva 07)

Kennedy idealistic approach on the Algerian case brought him fame and popularity among the colonized nations, after all the risk that he made was part of the cold war strategy, after the Algerian independence and during his presidency Kennedy shifted his position to pragmatism being more cautious in the US foreign policy field.

**3.5John F. Kennedy: Historiography and Legacy**

John F. Kennedy is one of the major figures in America's political history. He was a case of interest for historians, biographers, and revisionists. His powerful legacy was shaped by his contradictory positions during the Cold War. As a senator, he walked on the path of idealism, but as president, he was a realist just like the former president Dwight Eisenhower, whom he had previously criticized himself. As president, his foreign policy blended freedom and justice with pragmatic Cold War strategies, which gauged different reactions across the world.

Kennedy was deeply involved in key Cold War cases such as the Cuban Missile Crisis, Bay of Pigs, Berlin Crisis, Palestinian case, and support for Algeria. According to revisionists and scholars, Kennedy used different approaches during the Cold War in his Senate years and later during his presidency, which have created a legacy based on these contrasting approaches. Therefore, he has been labeled differently by historians, who place him within various schools of thought depending on how they assess his presidency. Some labeled him as idealistic, and others as realist.

Understanding how Kennedy has been labeled reveals how political ideologies introduce us to different schools of thought. Kennedy's foreign policy was hybrid in nature, blending realist actions with liberal rhetoric. Although he employed idealistic language, his strategies leaned more toward realism. This duality left behind a rich and complex legacy one that must be studied through the lens of his ideology, principles, and actions. This paper aims to explore and assess these dimensions of Kennedy's legacy. Historians noticed a duality in Kennedy's foreign policy, particularly when comparing the Algerian and Palestinian cases. His idealism was captured in the Algerian case, where in 1957 he gave speeches and spoke as a liberal savior. On the other hand, in the Palestinian case, he maintained his stance in supporting Israel in 1956. This contradiction highlights Cold War embargos that Kennedy's position helped shape due to its political impact and influence.

Kennedy idealistic approach during his senate was mainly seen in the Algerian case 1957, after taking presidency he aimed for global peace where he prevented nuclear use even within the NATO where he made nuclear test ban treaty 1963, peace corps 1961 a program that Kennedy made for the Favour of America, "The Peace Corps program was an outgrowth of the Cold War. President Kennedy pointed out that the Soviet Union "had hundreds of men and women, scientists, physicists, teachers, engineers, doctors, and nurses . . . prepared to spend their lives abroad in the service of world communism. The United States had no such program, and Kennedy wanted to involve Americans more actively in the cause of global democracy, peace, development, and freedom." (Kennedy1961)

Also made speech at American university in 1963, promoting for idealism and humanitarian approach as worlds policy. During his early period in presidency Kennedy has faced a crisis that idealism was not the right answer for it like bay of pigs invasion, according to an article the bay of pigs "Shortly after his inauguration, in February 1961, President Kennedy authorized the invasion plan. But he was determined to disguise U.S. support. The landing point at the Bay of Pigs was part of the deception. The site was a remote swampy area on the southern coast of Cuba, where a night landing might bring a force ashore against little resistance and help to hide any U.S. involvement" (Kennedy 1961) Kennedy have authorized the bay pig operation to contain communism, while avoiding direct military involvement, the attempt to hide the United States support for this operation has failed, and the operation's collapse exposed the realism of Kennedy's foreign policy, damaging the U.S. credibility in Kennedy's early presidency. Leaving an impact on his history as liberal savior. After the problems have escalated between Fidel Castro and john Kennedy due to the bay pigs invasion, Kennedy has faced another problem the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 which was cause by the Soviet Union that took a chance and created military base in Cuba on the frontier of the united states which 90 miles away from Florida, U.S. discovered the missiles and it almost led to a nuclear war during the cold war era but

Kennedy chose to compromise with the communist leader Nikita Khrushchev In this Cuban missile matter Kennedy used hybrid approached mixing both idealism and realism. The realistic approach accrued when he required using quarantine to protect its frontiers and prioritized national security to contain communism and invasions from the eastern bloc. On the other hand, he used idealism when he chose to negotiate with the soviet leader, which proved his power as a leader by force or negotiation. "Kennedy is often credited with averting the Cuban missile crisis, but Miroff emphasizes that his administration provoked the crisis and used it to get the Russians to acquiesce to the existing American nuclear lead— which made the possibility of a thaw strategically advantageous to the U.S" (Kuzmarov 8)

Kennedy was the one who provoked the crisis through the bay pig's invasion, then used the situation to his Favour after the Soviet Union have made military bases in Cuba which depicts Kennedy as conservative cold warrior not liberal Saviour. Kennedy also was an active politician during the berlin crisis of 1961 he increased US military presence in West Berlin to show determination. Kennedy visited West Berlin and delivered his famous "Ich Bin Ein Berliner" speech.

> "Freedom is indivisible, and when one man is enslaved, all are not free. When all are free, then we can look forward to that day when this city will be joined as one and this country and this great Continent of Europe in a peaceful and hopeful globe. When that day finally comes, as it will, the people of West Berlin can take sober satisfaction in the fact that they were in the front lines for almost two decades." (Kennedy 1963).

This speech highlights Kennedy's effort as a moral leader using idealism to prevent berlin's fall also it was a political declaration against communism, and the division that the cold war has created in Germany. The Palestinian case was one of the major cases during the cold war and Kennedy's stance on it has made debates and conflict with the Arabs for Kennedy's support for Israel, his stance was idealistic for the Israeli but realistic for Palestinians, in which he made speeches supporting the creation of Israel on the Palestinians land,

also he was the first American president to promote Israel with military aid during the cold war Kennedy allowed the sale to Israel of advanced US weaponry (the MIM-23 Hawk), as well as to provide diplomatic support for Israeli policies which were opposed by Arab Neighbours, such as its water project on the Jordan River.In a press conference Kennedy stated that: Now, on the question of what military assistance we would give the Israelis, as you know, the United States has never been a supplier of military equipment directly to the Israelis. We have given economic assistance, the Israelis themselves have bought equipment, a good deal of it from France. We will just have to see what the balance of the military power may be in the Middle East, as time goes on. (Kennedy 1963).

Kennedy's speech highlights realist pragmatism balanced by idealist caution, this approach gradually changed the US foreign policy, he also used a language that shows discomfort of military involvement that is opposed to cold war logic.

The foreign policy of John F Kennedy has been a subject of rich historiographical discourse shaped by his evolving position on colonialism and foreign policy during the cold war scholars have interpreted his approach to realism was linked to national affairs and idealism, rooted in moral principles, global cooperation, and public affairs.

Historiographers have been divided into three main schools regarding Kennedy foreign policy, idealistic view 1960s-1970s claimed that he is a traditional idealist view based on the perspective Schlesinger he framed JFK foreign policy into idealistic approach by examining and analyzing Kennedy's actions labeling them as idealistic approach even his aggressive actions " by explicit moral idealism, Kennedy, who hated to declare his idealism, by expressions of practical concern for the American interest , they generally arrived at the same conclusion"(Schlesinger 555). he often acted with moral values in mind. while his advisors talked more about what was good for America's power and interests. Revisionist realist view 1970s-1980s many revisionists have agreed on Kennedy's realism according to his strategies and operations that he had made

during his presidency like Cuban missile crisis, Vietnam, bay pig's invasion ...etc. "Two weeks before Kennedy's assassination, there is not a phrase in the voluminous internal record that even hints at withdrawal without victory. JFK urges everyone" focus on winning the war" withdrawal is conditioned in victory and motivated by domestic discontent with Kennedy's war" (Chomsky81) Chomsky interpretation reflects a revisionist-realist interpretation on JFK's Vietnam policy, where he was an active cold warrior. Idealism was secondary in this case due to domestic and political pressure.

Post Revisionist, pragmatic synthesis1990s-present, it offers a balanced interpretation about his duality where it is seen that he blended realist caution with idealist aspirations. "Dallek concludes that Kennedy was an above average rather than great president and that his determination to improve US- Soviet relations in light of the Cuban missile crisis might have led to real thaw in the cold war much earlier if only he had lived" (Bastian 128). This passage highlights Kennedy idealistic pragmatism if he had lived longer the cold war might have ended sooner with less tension and conflicts. As a result of previous studies, it is evident that president Kennedy used a hybrid method idealism and realism to protect the legacy that he was given, but in his senate years he praised idealism and moral principles, he was the first to create a third path to conserve world's peace during the cold war era. Kennedy left a great legacy as senator and president; his political intelligence kept his memory marked in history of the world.

**3.6Conclusion**

John F. Kennedy's foreign policy was defined by a dynamic tension between idealism and realpolitik; this duality shaped his approach during the cold war on many complex cases to preserve America's image in the world. His support for anti-colonialism and self - determination, was seen in the Algerian case speech of 1957 where positioned himself as libral savior and voice of the colonized nations, making risks in his own country and faced backlash from the French government. However, in the white house Kennedy also faced

backlash from the Arabs after selling missile hawks to the Israelis which was not in the Favour of the United States during the cold war and for the complexity of its dynamics, therefore he sought to maintain relations with the Arab world through his cautious engagement with leaders like Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser, sending and receiving endless letters about the Palestinian case.

Kennedy's administration was seen as pragmatic by post revisionists where he created a hybrid approach on the Algerian and Palestinian case by prioritizing the Israeli American relations over moral principles and humanitarianism. Kennedy's different approaches were both criticized and admired some view him as a liberal savior, and others as a Cold War strategist. continues to serve as a case study in the moral and strategic dilemmas of U.S. creating a space for analysis serving as a case study of the United States foreign relations and policies during a divided a period where the world was divided.

**General Conclusion**

The cold war era was shaped by two forces political stance and different ideologies communism and capitalism, the scramble over power involved attracting many decolonized nations as more as possible, the tension begun to rise when the two powers wanted the same region like the Mediterranean and the middle east which were strategic area to influence.

The United States had labeled itself as symbol of liberty while not being equal in its foreign policy toward all nations, the policy was under the influence of the cold war strategies and interest over supporting the liberation movements, the cold war was characterized by the end of imperialism, Diplomatic negotiations took precedence over military actions.

The Algerian and Palestinian case were the most significant in the Arab and western world for the complexity and contradiction of the U.S administration over the years which exposed cold war dynamics over peace and humanitarian concerns. The Palestinian case was not supported by the liberal country instead it provided the colonizer the Jews by economic and military support and created a new nation in an Arab land to benefit from its strategic location in the middle east On the other hand, we have the Algerian case which the American administration remained neutral at first than Kennedy chose to interfere, yet it was for strategic importance in the Mediterranean and for primary sources like gas and oil due to the tension of Arab American relations after its support to Israel the prices of oil were on fire the United States had to maintain other relations around the world.

The American foreign relations and foreign policy tends to show the strength of the economic and political system of the U.S administration during a period full of tenson under competition over the global power against the Soviet Union that was a strong opponent for its ideology that was convenient for newly independent countries like Cuba.

This case study has focused on john Kennedy the 35 president of the United States that left a great legacy of principles ideologies and tactics that made him a case interest of historians, revisionists and post revisionists. Kennedy evolving position on colonialism have been marked during his presidency there was a pragmatic shift on the Algerian and Palestinian case creating contradiction in his principles and policy. John f. Kennedy political legacy was shaped by cold war dynamics, as president and senator Kennedy operated on a global stage reshaping world's map and dynamics. His early political career reflects his humanitarian's stance on and liberal ideas. Kennedy as senator challenged colonial powers, positioning the United States as a savior for oppressed nations which helped the United States gain many allies of the newly independent nations even if it meant to receive threats from great colonial power and ally like France in which de Gaulle used a strong tone to keep him away from the French Algerian case during 1957 after his powerful speech about imperialism. However, Kennedy foreign policy helped shaping his international legacy. His efforts in containing communism were seen in bay of pig crisis, the Cuban missile crisis, and berlin crisis, Algeria and Palestine. these efforts demonstrate that his presidency shaped by both visionary aspirations and calculated restraint, Kennedy hybrid approach made him navigate the complexities of the cold war, while maintaining the name of progressive leader. Therefore, Kennedy's administration was shaped by complexities not contradiction only, being pragmatic and supporting decisions that serve the national security of the United States as a starter, by advocating for peace and decolonization he created a third path where his legacy reflected the moral compromises and strategic choices that define international and global leadership in a divided world. Despite his different positions on colonialism regarding Algeria and Palestine and the backlash and criticism that he had faced on both cases from Arabs and westerns, Kennedy chose to be pragmatic by doing what suits America first even if this reflected his contradiction and moral principles yet he managed to keep a global power in

control during the cold war. What raised a huge criticism was his operation of big pay invasion where Kennedy's administration has used military occupation in Cuba secretly which cause a major embarrassment

for the global power after its failure and exposure to the world, also the relations with Cuba have tensed but after the Soviet Union used the conflict for its convenience but Kennedy was a political genius in which he took the opportunity to ease the tense with the soviet union. Marking a huge shift in the American history as a diplomatic Saviour John Kennedy legacy has changed the cold war dynamics and if he was still alive during that period the cold war would have ended soon before escalating to 1991, he was a progressive president and leader he promoted for world peace continuously, the young president made a shift in the world history through his political stance, foreign relations, and public affairs. His presidency of two years faced many crises, and he handled them with courage and grace for the sake of the American security and world's peace by making different decisions some were positive, and others negative for America's image as a liberal power Other gaps or case studies to consider include the Big Pay Crisis and the Cuban Missile Crisis, particularly the relationship between Fidel Castro and President Kennedy following the U.S.-Soviet compromise.

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